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found in her car, and the officers testified that she was a less safe driver.” Silvers v. State, 297 Ga.App. 362, 677 S.E.2d 410 (April 7, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s DUI conviction. BOLO described vehicle driving erratically in certain area, giving car description and tag number; driver was “large,” but not other description. Officer found car in driveway 28 minutes later; hood was warm. Defendant opened door of home, admitted driving, failed field sobriety tests, but claimed his drinking occurred after driving. “[T]he trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was not required to accept as reasonable the inference or hypothesis that Silvers became intoxicated only after he arrived at his home or that someone else was driving his car.” Castaneda v. State, 292 Ga.App. 390, 664 S.E.2d 803 (July 2, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for DUI: “the evidence established that Castaneda purchased two cans of Dust-Off, wrapped in cellophane and bearing red safety tabs. Approximately nine minutes later, he drove his vehicle over a curb and a sidewalk, through the grass in a straight line – for, as characterized by the trial court, ‘a very considerable [ ] distance’ – and across a street; struck a mailbox; and struck a car before coming to rest in an open field. [fn] When [witness] Singh reached the damaged car after the collision, both Castaneda and his passenger were unconscious. When Castaneda awoke, he tried to drive away, but was unsuccessful. Singh then saw both men shove aerosol cans into the back seat. When the police searched the vehicle, they found two aerosol cans in the trunk, which was accessible from inside the car via the back seat, which was partially open. One of the cans was noticeably lighter than the other, and the plastic wrap and red tabs were missing from the cans. [fn] When [Officer] Hartley approached Castaneda and [passenger] Marks, he immediately noticed symptoms that, based on his training and experience, were consistent with inhalant use. Castaneda, who refused to undergo field sobriety or chemical testing, had no recollection whatsoever – even at trial – of leaving the roadway or striking the mailbox or the other vehicle. Given this evidence, the trial court was authorized to find Castaneda guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicating substances.” Dorris v. State, 291 Ga.App. 716, 662 S.E.2d 804 (May 29, 2008). “[D]riving a motor vehicle while intoxicated may be shown by circumstantial evidence; that, in order to sustain the judgment of conviction, the evidence need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except the guilt of the accused, but only reasonable inferences and hypotheses; and that it is for the trier of fact to decide whether a particular hypothesis is reasonable. Furlow v. State, 276 Ga.App. 332, 333-334(1) (623 S.E.2d 186) (2005). Here, [Officer] Ogles’s testimony as to the irregular manner in which Dorris’s truck was parked authorized the trial court to find that she had been driving the truck erratically. And Dorris’s testimony that she had consumed the alcoholic beverages while sitting in the truck in the medical center parking lot was contradicted by the officers’ testimony that no alcoholic beverage containers were found in or near the truck. The evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find that Dorris had consumed the alcoholic beverages before she arrived at the medical center.” Hughes v. State, 290 Ga.App. 475, 659 S.E.2d 844 (March 24, 2008). “We agree with Hughes … that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for driving under the influence of drugs. The investigating officer testified that he smelled freshly lit marijuana in Hughes’ truck when he arrived on the scene. Hughes, however, was not alone in the truck, and his passenger left the area before the police arrived. The officer offered no testimony that Hughes himself smelled of marijuana or exhibited any physical signs of intoxication. And the officer did not conduct any field sobriety tests or chemical testing to determine whether Hughes was intoxicated. Simply put, the State has not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Hughes had ingested or was under the influence of marijuana when his vehicle struck the child. The mere smell of marijuana in the truck does not meet the proof requirement. Absent speculation, no reasonable fact finder could discern the circumstances of that odor. As the investigating officer admitted, somebody else – particularly the passenger who fled the scene and was not interviewed by police – ‘could have actually been smoking the marijuana.’” Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga.App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. “In addition to Schlanger having slurred speech and bloodshot, watery eyes, being unsteady on his feet, admitting to drinking, having a blood-alcohol content of .136 gram percent, and driving his car off the roadway, the experienced arresting officer testified that, in his opinion, Schlanger was less safe to drive. See Lewis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 830, 832(1) (449 S.E.2d 535) (1994) (‘A police officer may give opinion testimony as to the state of sobriety of a DUI suspect and whether [the suspect] was under the influence to the extent it made him less safe to drive.’) This evidence was sufficient to sustain Schlanger’s conviction. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1). See Jones v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 194-195(1)(c) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005); Shoemake v. State, 266 Ga.App. 342, 345(3)(b) (596 S.E.2d 805) (2004).”