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Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga.App. 217, 653 S.E.2d 823 (November 2, 2007). “Yglesia argues that his speeding violation cannot be used as an indication that he was a less-safe driver. This argument fails [because] this Court has ruled that ‘the commission of a traffic violation can constitute evidence that a driver is impaired.’ (Footnote omitted.) Sistrunk [ v. State , - 287 Ga.App. 39, 651 S.E.2d 350 (July 31, 2007)] (failure to yield at a stop sign).” Accord, Crusselle v. State , 303 Ga.App. 879, 694 S.E.2d 707 (April 7, 2010). Merritt v State, 288 Ga.App. 89, 653 S.E.2d 368 (October 26, 2007). Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was under the influence of alcohol when he caused the collision that killed victim: “Testimony of eyewitnesses and of the trooper who investigated the accident established that Merritt was driving erratically and dangerously prior to the collision. ‘ No fact is better known or publicized than the fact that alcohol slows the reflexes, dulls the thinking processes, slows the impulse stimuli and reaction thereto. ’ (Punctuation omitted.) Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 168(2) (447 S.E.2d 115) (1994), citing Menendez v. Jewett, 196 Ga.App. 565, 569(5) (396 S.E.2d 294) (1990). Moreover, the jury was entitled to consider Merritt’s flight from the scene as evidence of his guilt. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 499, 503(1)(a) (627 S.E.2d 116) (2006) (defendant’s flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt). Further, Merritt’s admissions that there were two open bottles of liquor in his car prior to the fatal crash and that he had an alcohol problem on that day, amply support the jury’s finding that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive at the time he caused the Hall County collision.” First evidence of actual alcohol consumption by defendant came from defendant’s arrest after a second collision in another county three hours later; defendant testified that he had nothing to drink until after the collision in question. Horne v. State, 286 Ga.App. 712, 649 S.E.2d 889 (July 20, 2007). “To prove impairment, the State may present evidence of three types: ‘(i) erratic driving behavior, (ii) refusal to take field sobriety tests and the breath or blood test, and (iii) the officer’s own observations (such as smelling alcohol and observing strange behavior) and resulting opinion that the alcohol made it less safe for the defendant to drive.” (Punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 193(1) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005). Here the State used all three methods. (i) Manner of driving. Where there is evidence, as here, that the defendant has been drinking, the manner of his driving may be considered on the question of whether he has been affected by alcohol to the extent that he is less safe to drive. Id. at 193(1)(a). ‘For example, traffic violations may suggest the negative influence of intoxication on the operation of the vehicle.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. The jury was authorized to conclude that Horne’s running a red light, speeding, and failing to maintain his lane were traffic violations evidencing impairment. See id. (running a red light can be a sign of impairment). (ii) Refusal to undergo tests. Horne’s ‘refusal to submit to an alco-sensor test and to a later chemical test of [his] breath is circumstantial evidence of [his] guilt. ’ Matheson v. State, 249 Ga.App. 200, 201(1) (547 S.E.2d 774) (2001). See OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b) (refusal to submit to properly noticed chemical test is admissible against defendant). Together with other evidence, such refusals ‘would support the inference that [Horne] was an impaired driver.’ Jones, supra, 273 Ga.App. at 194(1)(b).” Officer’s observations of performance on field sobriety evaluations also supported conviction. Ojemuyiwa v. State, 285 Ga.App. 617, 647 S.E.2d 598 (May 31, 2007). Conviction reversed, evidence didn’t support defendant’s DUI charge. “[Officer] Owens testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Ojemuyiwa’s breath, and [Sgt.] Zell testified that he observed a strong odor of alcohol about her person. No sobriety tests were conducted. ‘[I]t has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presence or odor of alcohol on a driver’s breath does not, by itself, support an inference that the driver was impaired.’ [Cits.] There was no evidence offered to prove that Ojemuyiwa’s driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption. In fact, there was no evidence presented whatsoever as to Ojemuyiwa’s manner of driving, that her speech was slurred, her gait unsteady, or her eyes red and glassy, only that she became increasingly belligerent as she talked with the officers about her sister’s arrest. ” Accord, Bostic v. State , 332 Ga.App. 604, 774 S.E.2d 175 (June 25, 2015) (officer lacked probable cause for DUI arrest based solely on presence of alcohol and “bloodshot and watery” eyes). Gregoire v. State, 285 Ga.App. 111, 645 S.E.2d 611 (April 16, 2007). “[A]mple evidence supports the trial judge’s conclusion that Gregoire was driving under the influence, including the officer’s testimony regarding Gregoire’s erratic driving behavior and his characteristics and demeanor after the stop. This evidence, coupled with the officer’s testimony that, based upon his observations, police training and experience, Gregoire was a less safe driver as a result of being under the influence of alcohol, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Gregoire was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving while under the influence of alcohol.” Kimbrell v. State, 280 Ga.App. 867, 635 S.E.2d 237 (August 1, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for less safe DUI: defendant admitted he had been driving his motorcycle, clad only in black boxer shorts, “and