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properly. Thus it is possible to interpret Hardage's statements as a threat of criminal sanction for failing to properly perform the test. Nevertheless, we do not believe that Hardage was required to read Rowell a Miranda warning under the circumstances of this case” because “in this case Hardage gave Rowell an option of sorts: perform the test properly or go to jail. Thus a reasonable person in Rowell's position would have believed that she was not yet under arrest and that her detention still could be only temporary. Moreover, Hardage did not make these statements until Rowell had already consented to and begun performing the test.” State v. Padidham, 310 Ga.App. 839, 714 S.E.2d 657 (July 13, 2011), affirmed on other grounds, 291 Ga. 99, 728 S.E.2d 175 (May 7, 2012). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by suppressing alco-sensor test and Intoxilyzer results. Alco- sensor. “The trial court's determination that Padidham was in custody prior to taking the alco-sensor test was clearly erroneous. Padidham was permitted to wait in his own car rather than a police car; he was not handcuffed; and he was told by the officer that he had been stopped for speeding and was going to been given a ticket. The officer told Padidham that he thought he was too intoxicated to drive, but that he was going to verify this suspicion. He did not tell Padidham that he would be arrested. Padidham may not have been free to leave during the eight to ten minutes that elapsed before the alco-sensor test was administered, but not every detention is an arrest. [Cit.]” Trial court thus erroneously concluded that officer should have read Miranda before administering alco-sensor. Hale v. State, 310 Ga.App. 363, 714 S.E.2d 19 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for DUI and improper passing affirmed; defendant was in custody when alco-sensor administered, but still admissible without Miranda warnings because defendant asked for test himself. Arrest. “[B]ecause Hale was informed of the officer's intent to place him under arrest, a reasonable person in Hale's position would believe that his or her freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed, which thereby placed him in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225(3) (498 S.E.2d 262) (1998) (‘[H]aving been informed that she was going to jail, a reasonable person would have believed that the detention was not temporary. Therefore, the failure to give the Miranda warnings renders evidence regarding the field sobriety tests inadmissible.’); State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 476 (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (‘[A]bsent the officer making any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that she was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation, the officer's “belief” that probable cause exists to make an arrest does not determine when the arrest is effectuated until the officer overtly acts so that a reasonable person would believe she was under arrest.’). Voluntariness. But even though Hale was in custody for purposes of Miranda, the trial court did not err in admitting the results of the portable alco-sensor test because the portable test was administered in response to a demand from Hale, not the officer, thus making this situation clearly distinguishable from other custodial settings triggering the protections of Miranda and more akin to a spontaneous outburst from an unwarned suspect [fn] or a test conducted pursuant to the Georgia Implied Consent Statute. See State v. Carraway, 251 Ga.App. 469, 470 (554 S.E.2d 602) (2001) (noting that breath tests administered under the Georgia Implied Consent Statute do not infringe upon a suspect's right against self-incrimination, making Miranda inapplicable); State v. Lord, 236 Ga.App. 868, 868 (513 S.E.2d 25) (1999) (same); see also Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga.App. 400, 400 (512 S.E.2d 311) (1999) (urine test); State v. Moses, 237 Ga.App. 764, 764 (516 S.E.2d 807) (1999) (blood test). See generally State v. Coe, 243 Ga.App. 232, 233–34(2) (533 S.E.2d 104) (2000) (explaining that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated ‘by the choice granted by the Georgia Implied Consent Statute whether to submit to a chemical test of bodily substances such as blood, breath, or urine’).” State v. Curles, 304 Ga.App. 235, 696 S.E.2d 89 (May 28, 2010). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress field sobriety evaluations, Alco-Sensor and state test results based on alleged Miranda violation; contrary to trial court’s findings, defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Trial court found that “[a] reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave[,]” when officers came to defendant’s house at 5:30 a.m., responding to a call from a concerned citizen regarding a suspected DUI driver. Defendant’s mother allowed officers in the house and woke teenage defendant up to speak with them. Defendant agreed to officers’ request to step outside and see his damaged vehicle. “[P]retermitting whether the officers told Curles to step outside or requested that he do so, the evidence did not authorize the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person in Curles's position would have believed that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Monahan v. State, 292 Ga.App. 655, 658-659(1) (665 S.E.2d 387) (2008) (motion to suppress properly denied because officer's request that a DUI suspect step outside of her home to talk to the police did not render her in custody for Miranda purposes); Amin v. State, 283 Ga.App. 830, 831-833(1) (643 S.E.2d 4) (2007) (DUI suspect was not in custody for Miranda purposes when a police officer questioned him in a restaurant, took his driver's license, asked him to step outside, and then performed field sobriety evaluations before arresting him); State v. Foster, 255 Ga.App. 704, 706 (566 S.E.2d 418) (2002) (reversing exclusion of field sobriety tests based on defendant's argument that he was not given