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Miranda warnings where the tests were administered after the officer told the defendant not to drive because he was visibly drunk, instructed him to remain in the back seat of his vehicle, admonished the suspect that he would be arrested if he drove the car under the influence, watched the suspect climb into the front seat and drive the car away from the scene, and then asked the suspect to exit the car after he found it behind a building). Accordingly, because the officers' requests did not render Curles in custody for purposes of Miranda, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of what occurred after he left his house on the ground that he was not then given Miranda warnings. See State v. Lupuloff, 301 Ga.App. 513, 514 (687 S.E.2d 861) (2009); Monahan, 292 Ga.App. at 659(1).” See also Foster (June 10, 2002), below. Brown v. State, 299 Ga.App. 402, 683 S.E.2d 614 (July 1, 2009). 1. No right to Miranda warnings prior to alco-sensor test given before defendant taken into custody. 2. Fact that defendant was under 21 does not mean that defendant was in custody when officer asked her to take an alco-sensor test. Contrary to defendant’s argument, a positive test would not automatically mean that defendant was illegally in possession of alcohol under OCGA § 3-3-23, as there are some circumstances when a minor is authorized to possess and consume alcohol. Ferega v. State, 286 Ga.App. 808, 650 S.E.2d 286 (June 29, 2007). Admission of evidence that defendant refused to perform field sobriety evaluations did not violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against self- incrimination. “[T]he U.S. Supreme Court determined that the admission of evidence of a defendant’s blood sample does not violate the Fifth Amendment, because such evidence is not testimonial in nature. Schmerber v. California, [384 U.S. 757, 764-765 (86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908) (1966)]. And the Supreme Court held that the admission of evidence showing that the defendant refused to submit to a blood test was not subject to the privilege against self-incrimination ‘[s]ince no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal.’ South Dakota v. Neville, [459 U.S. 553, 562 (103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748) (1983)]. Likewise, this Court has concluded that the ‘[r]efusal to submit to field sobriety tests ... is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that [the suspect] was an impaired driver.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 273 Ga.App. 192, 194(1)(b) (614 S.E.2d 820) (2005). See also Hoffman v. State, 275 Ga.App. 356, 358(1) (620 S.E.2d 598) (2005). The element of coercion necessary to trigger Fifth Amendment protection was clearly absent in this case where Ferega was specifically told that the tests were voluntary and he refused to take them.” State v. Norris, 281 Ga.App. 193, 635 S.E.2d 810 (August 18, 2006). Trial court properly suppressed results of alco- sensor tests given after defendant was under custodial arrest, where neither Miranda nor implied consent warnings were given, and officer knowingly misled defendant by telling him that he had to take the tests. “In Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145 (335 S.E.2d 630) (1985), we found OCGA § 40-6-392 inapplicable to alco-sensor test results because they are not used ‘as evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in a person’s blood,’ Id. at 146(1) (emphasis in original) as specified in OCGA § 40-6-392(a), but instead are used ‘as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.’ Id. In contrast, OCGA § 40-5-55 applies to chemical tests of the ‘blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug.’ OCGA § 40-5-55(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, it does apply to an alco-sensor test.” Questions holdings of cases stating that post-arrest field sobriety evaluations require Miranda warnings, e.g., Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2), 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993); Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 224- 225(3), 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998); and State v. O'Donnell, 225 Ga.App. 502, 504(2), 484 S.E.2d 313 (1997). “Other decisions of both the Supreme Court and this court call into question the accuracy of that view. See Cooper v. State, [277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003)] (Georgia Constitution does not protect citizens from compelled blood or breath testing or from use of results of compelled testing at trial); Hughes v. State, 259 Ga. 227, 228(2)(b) (378 S.E.2d 853) (1989) (Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution has no application to results of field sobriety tests because they are not evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature); Keenan v. State, supra, 263 Ga. at 572 (OCGA § 24-9-20 inapplicable to alco-sensor field sobriety test because defendant was not charged in a criminal proceeding at the time he was asked to take test); Nawrocki v. State, 235 Ga.App. 416, 417(1) (510 S.E.2d 301) (1998) (use of a substance naturally excreted by human body does not violate defendant’s right against self-incrimination under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI of the Ga. Const.). In any event, if Norris had not been placed under custodial arrest, it would appear that he would not have had a right to refuse to perform the alco-sensor test.” Rule applying Miranda to post-arrest field sobriety evaluation is based, not on state or federal constitutions, but on statute, OCGA § 24-9-20(a). Moody v. State, 273 Ga.App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (June 15, 2005). “‘As a general rule, Miranda warnings are not required while an investigating officer conducts preliminary questioning or field sobriety tests; however, after a DUI suspect is under arrest, Miranda warnings must precede further field sobriety tests in order for evidence of the results to