☢ test - Í

(September 18, 2006) (“merely taking a driver’s license and proof of insurance” did not place defendant in custody); Amin v. State , 283 Ga.App. 830, 643 S.E.2d 4 (March 1, 2007); Gaines v. State , 297 Ga.App. 629, 678 S.E.2d 99 (April 24, 2009); Parker v. State , 307 Ga.App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (November 23, 2010); Avery v. State , 311 Ga.App. 595, 716 S.E.2d 729 (September 7, 2011). Harper v. State , 243 Ga.App. 705, 534 S.E.2d 157 (April 26, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress field sobriety results. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his detention hadn’t ripened into arrest, requiring Miranda warnings prior to field sobriety testing. “OCGA § 24–9–20(a) provides that no person who is charged with a crime can be compelled to give evidence against himself. Applying this statute, we have held that if an officer gives a field sobriety test to a person who is under arrest but who had not been warned of his right against self- incrimination, then the test is inadmissible. See State v. Warmack, 230 Ga.App. 157, 158, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998); State v. O'Donnell, 225 Ga.App. 502, 504(2), 484 S.E.2d 313 (1997). Conversely, if an officer gives a field sobriety test to a person who is not under arrest, then the test is admissible even if the person had not been warned of his Miranda rights. See Crum v. State, 194 Ga.App. 271, 272, 390 S.E.2d 295 (1990).” Even if detention was up to an hour, as defendant contends, “[w]e have previously held that a wait of 45 to 50 minutes from the time of a traffic stop to the commencement of an investigative search of a car did not convert the investigation into a custodial situation. See Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 213(3), 515 S.E.2d 397 (1999). Here, Harper was allowed to walk around. He was not placed in the back of the police car, nor was he handcuffed. Officer Stewart told Harper that he had called for a DUI task force officer because he was under suspicion of DUI. And although Officer Stewart told Harper that he was not free to leave while they waited for the DUI task force to arrive, not every detention is an arrest. See State v. Dible, 232 Ga.App. 73, 74, 502 S.E.2d 245 (1998). Under these circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude that his freedom of action was only temporarily curtailed and that a final determination of his status was simply delayed. The trial court's finding that Harper was placed under arrest only after the field sobriety test is not clearly erroneous.” Accord, Lyons v. State , 244 Ga.App. 658, 535 S.E.2d 841 (June 15, 2000) ( Miranda applies to custodial field sobriety evaluations, but court here could find that defendant wasn’t in custody); Abrahamson v. State , 276 Ga.App. 584, 623 S.E.2d 764 (November 30, 2005) (while waiting 10-15 minutes for DUI officer, sergeant had defendant wait in defendant’s own car, with door open, not handcuffed, not told she was under arrest); Thomas v. State , 294 Ga.App. 108, 668 S.E.2d 540 (October 17, 2008) (forty minute detention, according to defendant); Owens v. State , 308 Ga.App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (March 10, 2011) (twenty minute wait after initial portable breath test was for defendant’s benefit, to clear any residual mouth alcohol, and didn’t place defendant in custody). Forsman v. State, 239 Ga.App. 612, 521 S.E.2d 410 (July 29, 1999). Trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety evaluations, as such refusal did not implicate constitutional privileges against self-incrimination as long as defendant wasn’t under arrest. Gunn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 901, 514 S.E.2d 77 (March 12, 1999). Trial court properly found that defendant was not in custody when she performed field sobriety evaluations: after her car ran off the highway, defendant climbed an embankment, left the scene of the accident and went to a pay phone. A deputy found her at the pay phone and transported her back to her car in his patrol vehicle, where a state trooper was investigating the one-vehicle accident. “The trooper testified that he had not placed Gunn under arrest when he began questioning her. Further, he did not believe the deputy had arrested Gunn but was simply assisting her in getting back to her car.” Trooper questioned defendant about the accident and the smell of alcohol about her; she admitted drinking, took an alco-sensor test and apparently performed other field sobriety evaluations. Held, “although Gunn was seated in the back of a patrol car [with the door open] when she was questioned, she was not ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes. Gunn was in the patrol car because she had been transported back to the scene of the accident. She had a duty to remain at the scene during the investigation of the accident. OCGA § 40-6-270(a). A reasonable person would conclude that, under these circumstances, Gunn’s detention was temporary and not the equivalent of a formal arrest.” Further, “ the Fifth Amendment protections embodied by Miranda would be applicable only to [Gunn’s] statements, not the results of her field sobriety tests,” ignoring OCGA § 24-9-20(a) – see Norris (August 18, 2006), above. Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (February 2, 1999). Miranda warnings were not required before giving alco-sensor test where defendant was not in custody. Traffic stop lasting 45-50 minutes, in part waiting for an officer with an alco-sensor to arrive and in part looking for consent to search forms, did not amount to arrest. “We do not believe that the delays … was [sic] unreasonable, evidenced a lack of diligence, or converted the investigation into a custodial situation.” Accord, Brice v. State , 242 Ga.App. 163, 529 S.E.2d 178 (February 1, 2000).