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2. AND IMPLIED CONSENT Keller v. State, 286 Ga.App. 292, 648 S.E.2d 714 (June 28, 2007). “[I]t is well-established that the admission of pre- arrest refusal to undergo a sobriety test does not violate the right against self-incrimination. See Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2) (436 S.E.2d 475) (1993); Long v. State, 271 Ga.App. 565, 568(2) (610 S.E.2d 74) (2004).” State v. Pierce, 266 Ga.App. 233, 596 S.E.2d 725 (March 12, 2004). During traffic stop, after observing signs of alcohol use and defendant’s admission that he had had “two or three beers,” officer walked “toward Pierce’s open car door, saying, ‘I’m just going to shut your car door so some other drunk doesn’t take it off.’” Trial court found this comment sufficient to place defendant in custody, triggering Miranda and making subsequent non-Mirandized field sobriety evaluations inadmissible and subsequent implied consent reading untimely. Court of Appeals reverses; “when all the surrounding circumstances are considered, [officer’s] off-hand comment, though ill-advised, was insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that his detention would not be temporary. [Cit.]” Distinguishes Price v. State , 269 Ga. 222, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998), where defendant was told she was going to jail regardless of performance of field evaluations; “[h]ere, far from indicating that the tests were irrelevant, [officer] stated that the results of the field sobriety tests would determine Pierce’s status.” State v. Lentsch, 252 Ga.App. 655, 556 S.E.2d 248 (November 8, 2001). Reversal of trial court’s grant of motion to suppress. The results of state administered breath tests are admissible, including a defendant’s refusal to take such a test, notwithstanding that a suspect is in custody when the test is given and no Miranda warnings are given. The results of a breath test are not testimonial or communicative evidence. State v. Coe , 243 Ga.App. 232, 533 S.E.2d 104 (March 29, 2000). Whole court opinion. DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress implied consent urine test. After defendant’s arrest, implied consent was read and officer requested breath test. A search of defendant’s vehicle then revealed marijuana; officer re-read implied consent and asked for a urine test, to which defendant agreed. Overruling State v. Warmack, 230 Ga.App. 157, 158, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998), Court of Appeals holds that “neither due process nor the Georgia privilege against self-incrimination codified at OCGA § 24–9–20(a) is implicated by the choice granted by the Georgia Implied Consent Statute whether to submit to a chemical test of bodily substances such as blood, breath, or urine. Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433, 434(1)(a), 330 S.E.2d 588 (1985). Accord Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 627(2), 398 S.E.2d 360 (1990). See also State v. Mack, 207 Ga.App. 287(2), 427 S.E.2d 615 (1993). The distinction lies between performing incriminating acts, such as field sobriety tests, and submitting to breath, blood, or urine tests. Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga.App. 400, 401, 512 S.E.2d 311 (1999). See also Wessels v. State, 169 Ga.App. 246(1), 312 S.E.2d 361 (1983) (defendant's refusal to submit to chemical test is not compelled and so not violative of Georgia privilege against self- incrimination). The State ‘cannot force a defendant to act, but [nevertheless] can, under proper circumstances, produce evidence from his [body].’ Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 517–518(3), 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (surgical removal of bullet from murder suspect over objection not violative of privilege against self-incrimination under Georgia rule). See also Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519, 202 S.E.2d 428 (1973) (removal of bodily substance (blood) from unconscious suspect ‘does not cause the person to be a witness against himself within the meaning of Fifth Amendment protection and similar provisions of Georgia law.’) (citations omitted). Thus, an arrestee is not, under Georgia constitutional or statutory law, entitled to Miranda warnings before deciding whether to submit to the State's request for an additional test of breath, blood, or urine. State v. Lord, 236 Ga.App. 868, 870, 513 S.E.2d 25 (1999) (evidence not protected by privilege against self-incrimination cannot be suppressed due to absence of Miranda warnings). See Fantasia v. State, 268 Ga. 512, 513(2), 491 S.E.2d 318 (1997) (if there is no State coercion or compulsion, individual's right against self-incrimination not implicated by admission of breath test results).” Strong overruled by Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (March 27, 2015) to the extent Strong holds that dissipating blood alcohol is always an exigent circumstance justifying nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases. State v. Moses, 237 Ga.App. 764, 516 S.E.2d 807 (April 27, 1999). Prior to 1998 amendment to implied consent statute, officer wasn’t entitled to ask for a second breath or blood test if dissatisfied with first results; hence, Miranda warning was required before requesting second test per State v. Warmack, 230 Ga.App. 157, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998). “Effective March 27, 1998, the legislature amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1(a) to provide that “the requesting law enforcement officer shall designate which test or tests shall be administered initially and may subsequently require a test or tests of any substances not initially tested.” Ga.L. 1998, p. 210, § 2. Moses’ incident took place on May 19, 1998. Because officers are now authorized to require subsequent tests, the statutory underpinnings of Warmack’s conclusion have fundamentally changed. But its rationale is extant. Just as Miranda warnings were not necessary before requesting the initial test which