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an officer could require before the amendment, so Miranda warnings are not necessary before requesting additional tests, now that the amendment authorizes an officer to require them .” Scanlon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 362, 514 S.E.2d 876 (March 17, 1999). Defendant’s verbal consent to take implied consent breath test “was neither testimonial nor communicative in nature; it was neutral in its effect and thus, not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.” “Under the Georgia implied consent statutes, Scanlon was given a genuine choice whether to consent to a chemical breath test; she was not coerced or compelled to consent to chemical testing. Thus, even though she was not given Miranda warnings before being given the implied consent notice, her state constitutional right of due process and privilege against self-incrimination were not violated. Compare State v. Mack, 207 Ga.App. 287, 427 S.E.2d 615 (1993); [cits.].” Distinguishing Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 498 S.E.2d 262 (1998) (applying Miranda to post-arrest field sobriety evaluations): “A chemical breath test does not require the same sort of extensive verbal and physical responses, and a chemical test is usually performed after the police have already established probable cause by other admissible evidence.” Miles v. State, 236 Ga.App. 632, 513 S.E.2d 39 (February 23, 1999). Defendant’s silence when read implied consent warning was admissible, despite his contention that prior reading of Miranda warning led him to believe that his silence wouldn’t be used against him. “‘A defendant’s refusal to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of his arrest is admissible in evidence against him in any criminal trial.’ Moore v. State, 217 Ga.App. 536, 537(1), 458 S.E.2d 479 (1995). Each defendant who receives the implied consent warning is informed of this fact. OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b). We see no reason, in the circumstances of this case, why silence in the face of a request to take such a test should be treated any differently than a refusal. Allen v. State, 229 Ga.App. 435, 437-438(1), 494 S.E.2d 229 (1997) (A ‘non-verbal refusal’ to take a breath test is admissible). ‘[T]he choice afforded a suspect under the Implied Consent Statute does not rise to the level of constitutional self-incrimination.’ State v. Highsmith, 190 Ga.App. 838, 839, 380 S.E.2d 272 (1989); accord Buchnowski v. State, 233 Ga.App. 766, 768(2), 505 S.E.2d 263 (1998).” Accord, Ellison v. State , 242 Ga.App. 636, 530 S.E.2d 524 (March 8, 2000). State v. Lord, 236 Ga.App. 868, 513 S.E.2d 25 (February 22, 1999). Miranda not required before implied consent testing because there is no state compulsion in administering a breath test under the implied consent statute, and submission to a breath test does not infringe upon a suspect’s right against self-incrimination. “In Fantasia v. State, 268 Ga. 512, 491 S.E.2d 318 (1997), the Supreme Court of Georgia observed that both the United States and Georgia constitutional prohibitions against self-incrimination are ‘directed towards prohibiting the State’s use of coercion or compulsion to be a witness against oneself. Therefore, if there is no State coercion or compulsion, an individual’s right against self-incrimination is not implicated. [Cits.]’ Id. at 513(2), 491 S.E.2d 318. The court found that no State compulsion occurs in administering a breath test under the implied consent statute, and submission to a breath test therefore does not infringe upon a suspect’s right against self-incrimination. Id. at 514, 491 S.E.2d 318. The decisions of this Court are in agreement. See Heller v. State, 234 Ga.App. 630, 631(1), 507 S.E.2d 518 (1998). The choice to submit or refuse to submit to the state administered test pursuant to the implied consent statute ‘is not ... an easy or pleasant one to make, but the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Fantasia, supra at 514(2), 491 S.E.2d 318.” Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga.App. 400, 512 S.E.2d 311 (February 10, 1999). “Contrary to Kehinde’s contention, ‘[t]he choice afforded a suspect under OCGA § 40-5-55 ... either to agree or refuse to take a ... test, is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.’ State v. Mack, 207 Ga.App. 287(2), 427 S.E.2d 615 (1993). See also Lankford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 405-406(1), 419 S.E.2d 498 (1992). ‘In Georgia, the state may constitutionally take a blood sample from a defendant without his consent.’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Highsmith, 190 Ga.App. 838, 839, 380 S.E.2d 272 (1989).” Accord, Scanlon v. State , 237 Ga.App. 362, 514 S.E.2d 876 (March 17, 1999) (Defendant’s verbal consent to take implied consent breath test “was neither testimonial nor communicative in nature; it was neutral in its effect and thus, not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.”); State v. Moses , 237 Ga.App. 764, 516 S.E.2d 807 (April 27, 1999); Smith v. State , 239 Ga.App. 515, 521 S.E.2d 450 (August 3, 1999). Heller v. State, 234 Ga.App. 630, 507 S.E.2d 518 (October 5, 1998). “Heller … contends that the implied consent warnings, given to him as directed by OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2), were misleading and coercive in that they failed to inform him of the privilege against self-incrimination granted by Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 and OCGA § 24-9-20. This is patently without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that this privilege is not violated either by the admission into evidence of the results of the State-administered blood test following the reading of implied consent warnings, Fantasia v. State, 268 Ga. 512, 513-514(2), 491 S.E.2d 318 (1997), or by the