☢ test - Í

Damato's alcohol concentration exceeded 0.08 grams. The officer merely testified that Damato's alco-sensor result was ‘positive.’” Compare Rish (January 14, 2009), below. State v. King, 296 Ga.App. 353, 674 S.E.2d 396 (March 2, 2009). Trial court erred in granting demurrer; accusation was sufficient to charge defendant with per se DUI: “Although the accusation did not specifically allege that King's alcohol concentration resulted from alcohol consumed before his driving ended, the accusation was not defective because it alleged that King violated OCGA § 40-6-391 and it was titled ‘Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (Per Se).’ See Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga.App. 755, 757-758(1)(c) (577 S.E.2d 825) (2003). Thus, there could be no confusion over the crime King was charged with. See id. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in sustaining King's general demurrer regarding the DUI per se charge. See OCGA § 17-7-71(c) (providing that an accusation is sufficient either when it tracks the statutory language or when it is worded ‘so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood’ by the factfinder); [ State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga.App. 751, 753(3) (662 S.E.2d 828) (2008)]; State v. Howell, 194 Ga.App. 594, 595 (391 S.E.2d 415) (1990).” Reese v. State, 296 Ga.App. 186, 674 S.E.2d 68 (February 18, 2009). Defendant’s per se DUI conviction was supported by the evidence: “The neighbor's testimony that the accident occurred at dusk, the friend's testimony that Reese did not consume any alcohol between the accident and the appearance of police, and the officer's testimony that Reese's blood alcohol level would have decreased from the time of the accident to the time of testing [with a result of .245] authorized the jury to find that Reese's blood alcohol level was .08 or more at the time he drove his van into the ditch. See Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga.App. 777, 782(4) (527 S.E.2d 628) (2000) (evidence of the time elapsed between accident and test and that defendant did not consume additional alcohol during the two events was sufficient to sustain a conviction for per se DUI).” State v. Rish, 295 Ga.App. 815, 673 S.E.2d 259 (January 14, 2009). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress; although trial court correctly ruled that officer lacked probable cause for DUI-less safe arrest, officer had probable cause to arrest for DUI-per se. “The record shows that Rish admitted having had three to four drinks prior to driving and that he had consumed the last of those approximately thirty minutes before the traffic stop. Additionally, two alco-sensor tests administered to Rish showed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of greater than 0.08 grams. These facts established a reasonable probability that Rish was in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5) and gave Morgan probable cause to arrest him. See Lenhardt [ v. State, 271 Ga.App. 453, 454(1), 610 S.E.2d 86 (2005)] (police may use results of alco-sensor tests ‘in determining whether probable cause exists to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. [Cit.]’); Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga.App. 265, 270(2), 653 S.E.2d 841 (2007) (in determining probable cause in a DUI-per se case, factors to be considered may include the suspect's admission to drinking and the results of an alco-sensor test).” The suggestion here that the numerical result of an alco-sensor test may be used to support probable cause to arrest is a novel holding, not supported by the authorities cited or any others. Compare Damato (January 29, 2010), above. Peters v. State, 281 Ga.App. 385, 636 S.E.2d 97 (August 30, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for per se DUI reversed; no evidence showed how much time lapsed between driving and blood test. “The State submitted no evidence about the time the blood was drawn at the hospital, and there is no circumstantial evidence from which the time of the blood draw can be inferred.” Norton v. State, 280 Ga.App. 303, 640 S.E.2d 48 (July 6, 2006). Evidence was insufficient to establish alcohol level within three hours of driving, an element of per se DUI. “Although driving under the influence may be proven by circumstantial evidence, [cit.] the State did not put forth sufficient evidence that Norton had driven her vehicle within three hours prior to the Intoxilyzer 5000 test being administered at 4:12 a.m. [cit.] Although officers were notified of the collision at 2:30 a.m., they did not know when the collision actually occurred. At a minimum, some evidence of a ‘“fresh” accident scene’ is required to show recent operation of the vehicle . [Cit.] Evidence of a warm or running engine has been found sufficient to sustain convictions of per se violations in similar cases, [Cit.] but no such evidence was presented here. The State thus failed to prove an essential element of the crime.” Citing Abelson (September 15, 2004), below. Abelson v. State, 269 Ga.App. 596, 604 S.E.2d 647 (September 15, 2004). Per se DUI conviction reversed for lack of evidence that the alcohol level occurred within three hours of driving: “there simply is no circumstantial evidence in the record, such as a warm engine, leaking fluids, the engine still running, or any other indicia of a ‘fresh’ accident scene, from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that Abelson’s blood alcohol limit was .08 or higher within three