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hours of when he was driving, as required by OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5). Indeed, there is no indicia of recent operation of the car, as there has been in other cases involving per se DUI convictions on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Jarriel [ v. State, 255 Ga.App. 305 (565 S.E.2d 521) (2002)] (driver was found passed out behind the wheel with engine running); Goddard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 730, 733(2) (536 S.E.2d 160 (2000) (officer touched the hood of the car and found it was still warm).” Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 574 S.E.2d 372 (November 7, 2002). “The evidence showed that the collision occurred between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. The parties stipulated that Moore’s blood was drawn at 4:35 a.m. Thus, although the DUI statute does not require the driver’s blood to be tested within three hours of his driving, [cit.] in this case it most likely was. When Moore’s blood was tested, its alcohol concentration was 0.11 grams percent. A toxicologist testified that after a person stops consuming alcohol, his body continues to absorb the alcohol for about 30 minutes and then begins to eliminate the alcohol at a fairly constant rate of 0.015 grams percent per hour. This evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that, even if the test was not performed until three hours and five minutes after the collision, Moore had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 grams percent or more during the three-hour period after he ceased driving or exercising physical control of the vehicle .” Becker v. State, 240 Ga.App. 267, 523 S.E.2d 98 (October 6, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for DUI and vehicular homicide, trial court erred in suppressing results of State-administered blood and urine tests. OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires that testing after a serious injury accident, where the defendant is not first arrested, “be administered ‘as soon as possible.’ We have construed this language to mean, “as soon as practicable under the circumstances.” Seith v. State, 225 Ga.App. 684, 687, 484 S.E.2d 690 (1997). The trial court found that there was an unexplained delay in the giving of the tests.” Court of Appeals reverses, finding no evidence in the record as to how much time elapsed. R. PER SE – DRUGS Keenum v. State, 248 Ga.App. 474, 546 S.E.2d 288 (February 20, 2001). Although Georgia Supreme Court, in Love [June 1, 1999, below], found OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) unconstitutional as to marijuana use, the case states nothing about the statute being unconstitutional when applied to those convicted of driving with a detectable level of cocaine in their system. That is, although there could be instances where a driver was a “legal marijuana user,” there would never be an instance of a “legal cocaine user” so as to make the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Subsection is not unconstitutional as to cocaine. Accord, Head v. State , 303 Ga.App. 475, 693 S.E.2d 845 (March 18, 2010) (following Keenum although defendant presented evidence that opthamologists legally use eye drops containing cocaine hydrochloride in certain surgical and diagnostic procedures). Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (June 1, 1999). Per se DUI conviction based on marijuana used declared unconstitutional. 1. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), making it per se illegal to operate a moving vehicle with any amount of marijuana metabolite in one’s system, does not violate equal protection “because the statute singles out for punishment unimpaired drivers with low levels of marijuana metabolites in their body fluids, despite the fact that these drivers pose no threat to traffic safety, the purpose of the DUI statute. [Defendant] contends that there is no rational basis for treating unimpaired drivers with marijuana metabolites differently from other unimpaired drivers.” Supreme Court disagrees, based on evidence presented in trial court about the length of time metabolites stay in a user’s system, and the length of time a user remains impaired after use; evidence supports finding that the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. “ Through the enactment of a per se prohibition against driving after using marijuana, the General Assembly has acted to shield the public from the potential dangers presented by persons who drive while experiencing the effects of marijuana. In effect, the General Assembly has determined that ‘there is no level of illicit drug use which can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle; the established potential for lethal consequences is too great.’ State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706, 710 (App. 1994). See also People v. Fate, 159 Ill.2d 267, 201 Ill.Dec. 117, 636 N.E.2d 549 (1994) (the flat prohibition against driving with any amount of controlled substance in one's system was a valid exercise of the police power since it bore a rational relationship to the interests sought to be protected and the means adopted were a reasonable method to accomplish the objective). By enacting OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6), the legislature has made it easier for persons to ‘understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume virtually any amount of [marijuana]....’ Barnett v. State, [270 Ga. 472, 472-473, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999)]. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no merit to [defendant’s] first equal protection challenge.” 2. OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6) violates equal protection to the extent that it differently classifies legal and illegal users of marijuana. If driver has used marijuana illegally, State must prove only that he had metabolites in his system; but if use was legal, State must show impairment. Cites to legal use in foreign countries such as the Netherlands, and uses permitted under Georgia law such as medical treatment and research. “In light of … the fact that the effects of legally-used