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marijuana are indistinguishable from the effects of illegally-used marijuana, we are unable to hold that the legislative distinction between users of legal and illegal marijuana is directly related to the public safety purpose of the legislation. … Accordingly, we conclude that the distinction is arbitrarily drawn, and the statute is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.” Accord as to alprazolam (Xanax), Sandlin v. State , 307 Ga.App. 573, 707 S.E.2d 378 (January 19, 2011). S. SENTENCING State v. Ozment, 332 Ga.App. 82, 775 S.E.2d 564 (July 13, 2015). Following defendant’s non-negotiated guilty plea to DUI-less safe, no error in sentencing. Trial court wasn’t required to impose minimum sentence for second-in-five DUI where evidence of prior DUI wasn’t placed in evidence. Durrance v. State, 319 Ga.App. 866, 738 S.E.2d 692 (February 22, 2013). 1. As conditions of defendant’s sentence for per se DUI, trial court properly ordered defendant to stay away from his wife and to attend family violence counseling. “Notably, the evidence shows that prior to the DUI offense, Durrance was involved in a domestic disturbance with his wife in which he punched a hole in the wall of their residence. Durrance's actions caused his wife to flee the home and call the police. During the subsequent police encounter, officers observed a pistol laying in the rear floorboard of Durrance's vehicle. The pistol was loaded and a round fully chambered ready to fire. Based on these circumstances, the probation conditions that Durrance complete a domestic disturbance program and refrain from contacting his wife until completion of the program were reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the DUI offense. Additionally, given the above evidence, as well as evidence that Durrance had been previously convicted of family violence battery, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the probation conditions would help rehabilitate Durrance by addressing his issues with anger management and alcohol combined, as well as help prevent further criminal activity. See Payne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 483, 488–489(8), 615 S.E.2d 564 (2005) (in aggravated battery case, affirming conditions seeking to prevent excessive and unlawful drug and alcohol use during the period of probation since condition met objective of preventing further criminal activity); cf. Tuttle v. State, 215 Ga.App. 396, 397–398(2), 450 S.E.2d 863 (1994) (probation condition that precluded contact between defendant and the victim of crime bore a ‘reasonable relation to future criminal activity especially where a family relationship provided the opportunity for the past criminal conduct’).” 2. Trial court could require that defendant not drive without permission of the court. “Here, Durrance's driver's license was suspended by operation of law under OCGA § 40–5–63(a)(1), which provides for a 12–month suspension upon the first DUI conviction. Although Durrance could apply for possible reinstatement of his driver's license before the end of the suspension period, OCGA § 40–5–63(a)(1), this does not change the fact that the license is suspended for at least 12 months. Accordingly, the condition that Durrance seek the court's permission to drive was within the requisite statutory parameters.” Fowler v. State, 294 Ga.App. 864, 670 S.E.2d 448 (November 4, 2008). Trial court erred in sentencing defendant on both less-safe and per se DUI charges. “Because Fowler's conviction based on conduct violating OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5) (driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol level) poses the more serious risk of injury to property or the public, we affirm that conviction and reverse Fowler's conviction under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) (less safe).” Monahan v. State, 292 Ga.App. 655, 665 S.E.2d 387 (July 10, 2008). Rule of lenity doesn’t require merger of convictions for less-safe DUI and DUI-child endangerment. ““The rule of lenity applies where two or more statutes prohibit the same conduct while only differing with respect to their prescribed punishments. According to the rule, where any uncertainty develops as to which penal clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have the lesser of the two penalties administered.” Henry v. State, 284 Ga.App. 893, 894 n. 2 (645 S.E.2d 32) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted). In the instant case, however, the two Code provisions at issue do not prohibit the ‘same conduct’ because endangering a child by DUI requires an additional element of ‘transporting in a motor vehicle a child under the age of 14 years.’ OCGA § 40-6-391(1); compare Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (596 S.E.2d 147) (2004). Moreover, there is no uncertainty as to which penal clause is applicable. The Code provision proscribing child endangerment by DUI expressly sets forth the applicable penal clause. OCGA § 40-6-391(l) (pertinently stating, ‘An offender who is convicted of a violation of [this offense] shall be punished in accordance with the provision of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-21-1, relating to the offense of contributing to the delinquency, unruliness, or deprivation of a child’).” Rhodes v. State, 283 Ga. 361, 659 S.E.2d 370 (March 31, 2008). OCGA § 40-6-391(f), which “expressly prohibits sentencing under the First Offender Act in DUI cases,” does not violate state or federal constitutional equal protection guarantees. “Rhodes’s equal protection argument ran as follows: the First Offender Act provides more lenient treatment; many offenses more serious than DUI are not excluded from the First Offender Act; and therefore,