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excluding DUI crimes from First Offender Act treatment is unconstitutional.” Supreme Court, noting that the classification of DUI offenders as separate from other offenders “is not one based on inherently constitutionally suspect criteria,” finds a rational basis for the legislative act. “Rhodes’s equal protection argument boils down to nothing more than the claim that the General Assembly has made a bad policy judgment about which offenders should be eligible for First Offender Act treatment and which offenders are too imminently dangerous to public safety to be given the opportunity the First Offender Act offers. [fn, noting the similar exclusion of other offenses from the First Offender Act] Rhodes’s argument is quintessentially political, not legal, and should be directed to the General Assembly and the Governor rather than this Court.” Johnson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 258, 638 S.E.2d 406 (November 3, 2006). After entering negotiated plea to DUI and related offenses, defendant was sentenced to twelve months to serve with no fine on the DUI charge, and twelve months probation with related fines and conditions on the other charges. Defendant challenges imposition of conditions he contends are unique to DUI offenses but not properly imposed in this case: DUI fine surcharges (brain/spinal cord fee, DUI victim surcharge, crime lab fee) without a DUI fine, and DUI probation conditions (DUI school, community service, multi-DUI offender photo fee) without DUI probation. Held, trial court erred in imposing DUI fine surcharges (brain/spinal cord fee, DUI victim surcharge, and crime lab fee) where no DUI fine was imposed; but other conditions were within trial court’s discretion. As to fine surcharges: the brain/spinal cord fee and DUI victim surcharge “are contingent upon the imposition of a fine,” while the crime lab fee is only imposed where the defendant was “sentenced to probation on the DUI offense.” As to the other probation conditions: “[T]he conditions at issue are arguably peculiar to a DUI conviction, particularly the DUI risk reduction course and the $25 photograph fee. [fn] They are also, however, reasonably related to the nature of the offense and the rehabilitative goals of probation. [Cit.] The DUI course requirement had rehabilitative value and certainly was relevant, considering that Johnson was sentenced to a DUI charge in this same case and had a lengthy DUI history. See Mangiapane v. State, 178 Ga.App. 836(1) (344 S.E.2d 756) (1986). The community service requirement had similar rehabilitative value. The requirement that Johnson pay a $25 fee so that his photograph could be taken and published served the dual purposes of rehabilitation and the protection of society.” No abuse of discretion in imposing these conditions.” Dozier v. Jackson, 282 Ga.App. 264, 638 S.E.2d 337 (October 6, 2006). Department of Driver Services properly suspended defendant’s driver’s license for three years based on her conviction for DUI and DUI – child endangerment, both arising out of the same incident. Department properly applied a separate suspension for each charge in accord with the “plain language” of OCGA § 40-5-63(a). “In drafting the License Suspension Statute, the General Assembly did not specifically require separate ‘arrests’ as it did with the motor vehicle habitual violator statute at issue in Wilson [ v. Miles, 218 Ga.App. 806, 463 S.E.2d 381 (1995).] Neither did the General Assembly insert a qualifying phrase to provide that multiple convictions resulting from a common indictment would be deemed only one conviction, as it did in the recidivism statute. OCGA § 17-10-7(d). As a result, we find that the plain language of the License Suspension Statute does not require that convictions result from separate arrests or separate and isolated incidents.” Slayton v. State, 281 Ga.App. 650, 637 S.E.2d 67 (September 22, 2006). Express language of OCGA § 40-6-391(l) prohibits merger of DUI and child endangerment convictions. Accord, Monahan v. State , 292 Ga.App. 655, 665 S.E.2d 387 (July 10, 2008) (also, rule of lenity doesn’t apply). Winstead v. State, 280 Ga. 605, 632 S.E.2d 86 (June 12, 2006). DUI defendant could not appeal trial court’s failure to order him to obtain ignition interlock device (so that he could challenge the statute’s constitutionality). “In situations where a defendant has received a sentence that is too lenient under the law, it has been held that a ‘defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal that he was “accorded an unmerited privilege with beneficent results.”’ Woodson v. State, 267 Ga.App. 636, 638 (600 S.E.2d 717) (2004), quoting Fortson v. Hopper, 242 Ga. 81, 82 (247 S.E.2d 875) (1978).” Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235 (March 10, 2006). Trial court erred in sentencing defendant to house arrest in lieu of mandatory 72 hours incarceration for second DUI conviction in five years. “House arrest is not incarceration; ‘[s]uch limited confinement does not constitute incarceration, which refers to continuous and uninterrupted custody in a jail or penitentiary.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McKinney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 812, 815(2) (525 S.E.2d 395) (1999). Further, Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ed.) defines ‘incarceration’ as imprisonment or confinement in a jail or penitentiary.” State v. Dyer, 275 Ga.App. 657, 621 S.E.2d 615 (September 28, 2005). On conviction for DUI – per se, OCGA § 40-6- 391(a)(5), trial court erred in failing to sentence defendant to serve 24 hours minimum jail sentence. Trial court