☢ test - Í

instead gave defendant “credit for the few hours served prior to her plea and required her to remain in the courtroom until 2:00 p.m. to complete the confinement requirement.” Remanded for resentencing.

Kellam v. State, 271 Ga.App. 125, 608 S.E.2d 729 (December 16, 2004). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to attend a treatment program as part of his DUI sentence. “‘A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing to impose conditions reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the rehabilitative goals of probation. [Cit.]’ Harrell v. State , 253 Ga.App. 440, 441 (1) (559 S.E.2d 155 (2002).” Costin v. State, 269 Ga.App. 632, 605 S.E.2d 73 (September 16, 2004). “Costin was charged with driving under ‘the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive.’ Apparently, Costin refused to submit to chemical testing, which would have established his blood-alcohol content. And there was no evidence presented at Costin’s plea hearing to establish blood alcohol content. Under these circumstances, the statute does not mandate that Costin serve 24 hours in jail. The trial court, however, misinterpreted the statute, finding that it required such service. Based on this finding, the trial court refused to consider Costin’s request that it waive the remainder of his jail time. Although the trial court was not required to suspend or probate any portion of Costin’s jail time, we have held that a trial court errs when it refuses to consider viable sentencing options and thus fails to exercise its discretion.” Distinguishing Phillips v. State , 241 Ga.App. 689, 527 S.E.2d 283 (1999), where evidence at sentencing disclosed alcohol concentration of 0.11 (see below). State v. Lin, 268 Ga.App. 702, 603 S.E.2d 315 (July 23, 2004). Trial court erred in failing to sentence defendant to an aggregate 12 months of jail and probation on a first DUI. “Georgia’s DUI statute, OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E), provides explicitly that, after the first conviction for driving under the influence, the defendant shall be sentenced to, among other penalties, ‘ a period of probation of 12 months less any days during which the defendant is actually incarcerated.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Based on this mandate, the legislature’s clear purpose was to insure that anyone convicted of DUI would serve an actual sentence of 12 months of combined confinement and probation, regardless of the fact that there may be factors which would reduce the confinement time which a defendant might serve. Even if the confinement time is reduced, such period of reduction is automatically included under the probation sentence.” Court’s attempt to sentence defendant to 11 months, 29 days, to avoid problems with immigration, was an illegal sentence. Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. State v. Villella, 266 Ga.App. 499, 597 S.E.2d 563 (March 24, 2004). Trial court erred by not including requirement of ignition interlock device as a condition of defendant’s probation after conviction for second DUI in five years. Fact that defendant intends to move out of state does not authorize court to omit this condition, which is mandatory under OCGA § 42-8-111 except upon a finding of financial hardship. Patel v. State, 247 Ga.App. 815, 545 S.E.2d 383 (February 5, 2001). Trial court erred in ruling that it had no discretion to modify defendant’s sentences for following too closely, leaving scene of accident, and reckless driving, but correctly ruled that it could not modify DUI sentence. As to most misdemeanors, OCGA § 17-10-3(b) provides, “The sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend, or probate sentences under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of [OCGA § 17-10-3] at any time….” “But such discretion does not extend to the sentence for driving under the influence . Sentences for driving under the influence are otherwise provided for by OCGA § 40-6-391(c).” This appears to be an erroneous reference to 40-6-391(f), which says “The provisions of Code Section 17-10-3… shall not apply to any person convicted of violating any provision of this Code section.” Vacated and remanded for consideration of defendant’s motion for modification of sentence. Phillips v. State, 241 Ga.App. 689, 527 S.E.2d 283 (December 28, 1999). Sentence of 24 hours in jail on Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; even though defendant pled guilty only to DUI as less safe driver, not to driving with an illegal blood-alcohol concentration, court had to impose that sentence under OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(B) since defendant admitted she drove with a .11 blood-alcohol level. Taylor v. State, 238 Ga.App. 753, 520 S.E.2d 267 (June 29, 1999). Defendant’s separate sentences on three DUI convictions based on his driving under the influence of alcohol, cocaine and marijuana reversed; defendant committed a single offense when he drove under the combined influence of all three substances; cases remanded for resentencing. Accord, Chernowski v. State , 330 Ga.App. 702, 769 S.E.2d 126 (February 12, 2015) (DUI-per se and DUI-less safe convictions, based on same act, should have merged for sentencing).