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Tunali v. State , 311 Ga.App. 844, 717 S.E.2d 341 (October 4, 2011). In prosecution for driving a commercial vehicle with a detectable presence of alcohol and related offense, trial court properly denied motion to suppress; contrary to defendant’s argument, motor carrier safety regs are proper subject of judicial notice. “[T]he Georgia Public Service Commission has formally adopted motor carrier safety regulations issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, as codified in the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, which is the official compilation made by the Georgia Secretary of State under the APA. See Taylor v. State, 305 Ga.App. 748, 749, n. 1, 700 S.E.2d 841 (2010) (‘The Georgia [DPS] is charged with enforcing federal motor carrier regulations, which have been adopted under Georgia law, and officers of the department have authority to stop commercial vehicles for safety inspections.’); Solano–Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga.App. 896, n. 2, 673 S.E.2d 351 (2009). See also Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 515–16–4–.01; Ponce [ v. State, 279 Ga.App. 207, 208-210(2), 630 S.E.2d 840 (2006)] (describing publication of rules by the Secretary of State under the APA). Under these rules, certain officers of DPS, such as the officer in this case, are authorized to stop commercial vehicles to conduct safety inspections under Georgia's regulations. [fn] The traffic stop in this case occurred after the formal adoption of the federal rules; thus we take judicial notice of the rules as adopted. [fn]” In this case, those rules plus officer’s testimony establish articulable suspicion for stop of commercial vehicle. Ponce v. State, 279 Ga.App. 207, 630 S.E.2d 840 (May 5, 2006). PSC rules in question here could not be judicially noticed as “those rules have not become effective under the [Administrative Procedures Act].” “Rules that are not promulgated pursuant to the APA are not entitled to judicial notice. See Commissioner, Dep't of Human Resources v. Haggard, 173 Ga.App. 676, 677 (327 S.E.2d 798) (1985) (rule never filed with or published by Secretary of State not entitled to judicial notice); Dix v. State, 156 Ga.App. 868, 869 (275 S.E.2d 807) (1981).” Rules here were not included in the Secretary of State’s official written compilation or on the Secretary of State’s website, but were accessible on the PSC’s own website and available by hyperlink from the Secretary of State’s website. “[B]ecause the Secretary of State’s official printed compilation of Georgia’s rules and regulations does not contain or refer to the rules, we conclude that the Secretary of State has not ‘published’ them within the meaning of the APA. Even if the hyperlink on the Secretary of State’s website can be construed as a publication of the rules, that link is supplied only ‘as a courtesy’ and is accompanied by a caveat that the transportation rules ‘are not subject to the requirements of the [APA].’” B. ADMISSIONS IN JUDICIO Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (October 29, 2012). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; at competency trial, no error in allowing State to tender defendant’s pleading denying that he was incompetent. “The trial court was correct in ruling that the pleading was admissible as a statement in judicio. See OCGA § 24–3–30 (‘Without offering the same in evidence, either party may avail himself of allegations or admissions made in the pleadings of the other.’).” C. AGENT ADMISSIONS See new OCGA § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D) Flading v. State, 327 Ga.App. 346, 759 S.E.2d 67 (May 22, 2014). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defense stipulation entered at ALS hearing, wherein defendant agreed to plead guilty in consideration of officer’s withdrawal of notice of license suspension based on implied consent refusal. At trial, “[t]he State … introduced, over objection, a document entitled ‘Final Decision’ completed at an administrative license suspension hearing (‘ALS hearing’).[fn] Officer Ott explained that he was present at the ALS hearing and spoke with Sarah Hoffman, an attorney who represented Flading at that time and agreed that, in exchange for pleading guilty to the DUI charge, Flading would be permitted to keep his license. The Final Decision, which was signed by Officer Ott and Hoffman, was read to the jury in part, including the following: ‘This withdrawal is based on an agreement between the arresting officer and [Flading]. In exchange for the arresting officer's withdrawal of this sworn report, [Flading] shall enter a plea of guilty to the underlying charge of violating O.C.G.A. § 40–6–391. The parties agree that a copy of this final decision may be admitted into any subsequent legal proceeding involving the charge as an admission by [Flading] of [Flading's] guilt or nolo contendere in exchange for the rescission of the administrative license suspension. The parties further agree that if [Flading] fails to enter the required plea, this order may be voided and the sworn report refiled with the [Department of Driver Services].’” 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no general prohibition against admission of evidence, arising from ALS hearings, at trial; distinguishing cases holding that ALS rulings aren’t res judicata/collateral estoppel against the State, Wyatt v. State, 179 Ga.App. 327, 346 S.E.2d 387 (1986); Sheffield v. State, 184 Ga.App. 141, 361 S.E.2d 28 (1987) (physical precedent only); Hunter v. State, 191 Ga.App. 769, 382 S.E.2d 679 (1989); and Swain v. State, 251 Ga.App. 110, 552 S.E.2d 880 (2001). 2. Admissions by defense counsel, authorized