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by defendant, are admissible against defendant. “Flading, having accepted the benefit of the stipulation in the form of the reinstatement of his license and having shown no fraud or mistake, acquiesced to his counsel's stipulation to plead guilty to the DUI and to the admissibility of the Final Decision in a subsequent legal proceedings related to the DUI charge. See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga.App. 190, 195(3), 744 S.E.2d 413 (2013).” “ FN5: [T]he fact that the stipulation was signed by [defense counsel] and does not contain his personal signature … does not change the outcome here.” 3. The stipulation wasn’t excludable under OCGA § 24-4-403 as being substantially more prejudicial than probative. “Flading's stipulation that he would plead guilty to DUI in exchange for the return of his drivers' license is relevant to, though certainly not dispositive of, the charge that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. … The Eleventh Circuit has described Rule 403 as ‘an extraordinary remedy which the [courts] should invoke sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.’ [ United States v. Sumner, 522 Fed.Appx. 806, 810 (11 th Cir., 2013)] (citing United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11 th Cir., 2011)). ‘The reason for such caution is that relevant evidence in criminal trials is inherently prejudicial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. The Eleventh Circuit has further explained that ‘[t]he major function of Rule 403 is to exclude evidence of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Aguila– Urbay, 480 Fed.Appx. 564, 567 (11 th Cir., 2012). We find that the Final Decision at issue in this case is neither of ‘scant or cumulative probative force’ nor introduced by the State merely for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” 4. Stipulation wasn’t excludable as an offer to compromise. “ FN4: [U]nder our new Evidence Code, the exclusion of offers to compromise ‘shall not require exclusion of evidence offered for another purpose, including, but not limited to, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue delay or abuse of process, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.’ OCGA § 24–4–408(c) (tracking Federal Rule of Evidence 408); see also United States v. Levinson, 504 Fed.Appx. 824, 828 (11 th Cir., 2013) (Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and its exceptions apply to both criminal and civil proceedings).” D. ALTERNATIVE PERPETRATOR/THIRD PARTY GUILT Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 783 S.E.2d 652 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly excluded evidence of “a prior shooting of the victim, which Appellant asserts would show that there were other potential suspects in the victim’s murder. … [T]he trial court was not required to allow Appellant to introduce evidence ‘based purely on rumor, speculation, and conjecture.’ Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 633, 754 S.E.2d 335 (2014). See also OCGA § 24–4–403.” Carver v. State, 331 Ga.App. 120, 769 S.E.2d 722 (February 10, 2015). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error in ruling out proposed alternative perpetrator evidence. Crime here involved molestation of a young boy; proposed other suspect pled guilty to statutory rape of a 15-year old girl 13 years earlier. “‘There is simply no logical connection between the acts of [the witness committing statutory rape of a female] and the direct hands-on same-sex child molestation of [the victim ten years later],’” quoting Bradford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 568, 569, 420 S.E.2d 4 (1992). Russell v. State, 295 Ga. 899, 764 S.E.2d 812 (October 20, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded proposed evidence “regarding a drug-related armed robbery allegedly perpetrated on the victims some 32 hours prior to the murders. The defense had sought to adduce such evidence in support of a theory that the murders had been committed by the same individual(s) who had allegedly committed the robbery. … Evidence implicating another individual as the actual perpetrator of a crime is admissible only if it identifies a specific person having a direct connection with the corpus delicti. Azizi v. State, 270 Ga. 709(6) (512 S.E.2d 622) (1999). … Here, the connection between the robbery and the victims' murder was purely conjectural, and the evidence was thus properly excluded for this reason. Moreover, the proffered evidence, to the extent it would have implicated the victims in drug-related activities bearing only a speculative factual nexus with the crimes at issue here, was inadmissible character evidence . See, e.g., Roseberry v. State, 274 Ga. 301(2) (553 S.E.2d 589) (2001) (affirming exclusion of evidence regarding victim's debts and alleged illegal activities because it lacked a sufficient factual nexus with the crimes at issue).” Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014). Felony murder and armed robbery convictions affirmed. No error in ruling out proposed defense evidence of other possible perpetrators “based purely on rumor, speculation, and conjecture.” Jones v. State, 320 Ga.App. 681, 740 S.E.2d 655 (March 22, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence that co-defendant was found with a stolen television, unrelated to the charges on trial. “The fact that a third party committed an unrelated burglary in some other part of town more than 24 hours before the