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commission of the crimes at issue does not raise an inference that Jones is innocent of those crimes. See Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 377(3), 637 S.E.2d 652(2006) (‘[a] reasonable inference of a defendant's innocence is raised by evidence that renders the desired inference more probable than the inference would be without the evidence’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Nor does the fact that the stolen television was found in Robert's car ‘directly connect’ the burglar with the commission of the crimes at issue.” Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (March 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded hearsay testimony of statements allegedly made by two other people allegedly claiming to have committed the crimes. Defendant sought to show that several people in the community, himself included, had falsely claimed credit for the shooting of the victim; but this claim, by definition, defeated defendant’s claim that the statements were admissible under the necessity exception, which requires indicia of reliability. Curry v. State, 291 Ga. 446, 729 S.E.2d 370 (July 9, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of forcible sex crimes committed by a neighbor four years later in the same home as the offenses here, and 14 years later in another county. “[Neighbor] Grable's crimes were not similar to those for which Curry was tried; among other dissimilarities, no evidence suggested that Curry's victims were the targets of any sexual attack. See id. Nor did Grable's crimes directly connect him to the corpus delicti, and at most cast a bare suspicion upon him.” Accord, Carver v. State , 331 Ga.App. 120, 769 S.E.2d 722 (February 10, 2015) (alternative perpetrator evidence “must directly connect the other person with the corpus delicti, or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature. Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 632–633(8), 754 S.E.2d 335 (2014) (citation omitted). ‘Evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.’ Bradford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 568, 569, 420 S.E.2d 4 (1992) (citations and punctuation omitted).”). Ridley v. State, 290 Ga. 798, 725 S.E.2d 223 (March 5, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly limited defense cross-examination of detective about other crimes of alleged alternative perpetrator. “On cross- examination, Ridley wished to ask Detective Green about a robbery and an unrelated murder. Ridley, however, had no proof of Perry's conviction of robbery such as a certified copy of a conviction, and it is undisputed that Perry was never indicted or convicted of the unrelated murder. Moreover, ‘a defendant is entitled to introduce relevant and admissible testimony tending to show that another person committed the crime for which the defendant is tried. However, the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant's innocence, and must directly connect the other person with the corpus delicti, or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature.’ (Citations omitted.) Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573(3), 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998). [fn] The crimes about which Ridley sought to ask do not meet these criteria. The trial court did not err in excluding this evidence.” Mutazz v. State, 290 Ga. 389, 722 S.E.2d 47 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “failing to offer evidence of a prior violent act by [co-defendant] Geter, in support of Appellant's sole defense that Geter alone committed the murder.” “Unlike the crimes here, the previous incident did not involve any premeditation, prior relationship with the [victim] deputy, or use of a weapon to cause serious or fatal injuries.” Such evidence was in no way inconsistent with defendant’s participation in this murder. “Even assuming that evidence of Geter's prior violent act would have been admissible, we conclude that Appellant has failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if his attorney had offered such evidence.” Hall v. State, 309 Ga.App. 222, 709 S.E.2d 910 (April 11, 2011). Conviction for permitting a child to be present during manufacture of methamphetamine affirmed; trial court didn’t abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that other persons were involved in the manufacture of the drug, as such evidence did not “have any bearing on the crime of which Hall was convicted — that is, permitting children in a place where methamphetamine was being manufactured.” Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294 (March 25, 2011). Convictions for felony murder, kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; no error in “excluding as hearsay a statement that co-defendant Owens, who did not testify at trial, made to the police in which he admitted that he drove the victim’s car from the crime scene and that Brown was unable to drive the victim’s car. Brown wanted to link Owens’s statement to [witness] Robbins’s testimony at trial that he was certain that the person he saw run back to the car just after the fatal shots were fired got into the driver’s seat and drove the car away. Brown could then argue to the jury that even though he was present at the crime scene, he was not the shooter.” “The evidence excluded in this case may have been probative, in combination with Robbins’s testimony, as to whether Owens or Brown was the shooter, but it was far from a confession by Owens that he rather than Brown shot and