☢ test - Í

killed the victim. In addition, Brown conceded at trial that there were other witnesses who could testify that he could not drive the victim’s car – including Brown himself – so there was no necessity for hearsay on this point. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained the State’s hearsay objection.” Quotes at length from Drane (November 1, 1999), below. Hilton v. State, 288 Ga. 201, 702 S.E.2d 188 (November 8, 2010). Murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence of co-conspirator’s alleged statement exonerating defendant was properly excluded as unreliable. “The statement was made many years after the murder, not spontaneously shortly after the crime occurred; it was not corroborated by any other evidence but instead was inconsistent with other evidence that [declarant] Thomas ordered the killing of Officer Green but was not personally involved in the actual shooting; and the declarant was deceased and thus not present and available for cross-examination. Moreover, Ms. Thomas testified that [gang] members like her husband engaged in ‘disinformation,’ disseminating misinformation as to who committed crimes. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the hearsay statements.” Bush v. State, 305 Ga.App. 617, 699 S.E.2d 899 (August 19, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly limited defendant’s cross of officer “about criminal charges brought against other persons involved in the underlying incident. … The limitation imposed by the court concerned only the issue of charges brought against other parties; otherwise, Bush's counsel was allowed to and in fact did continue to cross- examine the officer and to attempt to impeach the officer with prior inconsistent statements. Nevertheless, Bush argues that this limitation prevented him from demonstrating that ‘one of the other parties may have sold the drugs to the purchaser.’ A criminal defendant may introduce evidence that another person committed the crime for which he is tried, but the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant's innocence. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 376(3) (637 S.E.2d 652) (2006). Bush did not show that allowing cross-examination about whether another party was charged with the offense of selling cocaine would have raised a reasonable inference that Bush was not guilty of the separate offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Accordingly, we find that the court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in limiting Bush's cross-examination of Sutton. See Davis v. State, 253 Ga.App. 803, 807(10) (560 S.E.2d 711) (2002) (scope of cross-examination is in trial court's discretion, which is reviewed on appeal for manifest abuse).” Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688, 699 S.E.2d 13 (June 28, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in refusing to admit “into evidence a sworn notarized writing by Westmoreland in which he declared that ‘[co-defendant] Williams picked me up for a ride and had no knowledge of any burglary.’ Williams argued that the hearsay statement is admissible under OCGA § 24-3-5 , which provides that after a conspiracy is proved, hearsay declarations by one conspirator are admissible against all co-conspirators. By its terms, this statutory exception to the hearsay rule ‘makes declarations of conspirators admissible only against other conspirators.... It is the long- standing rule in this state that declarations to third persons to the effect that the declarant and not the accused was the actual perpetrator are, as a rule, inadmissible.’ (Emphasis deleted.) Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 814(4) (525 S.E.2d 339) (1999), overruled on other grounds in O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758(3) (670 S.E.2d 388) (2008). See also Dunbar v. State, 205 Ga.App. 867, 869 (424 S.E.2d 43) (1992) (OCGA § 24-3-5 ‘may only be used against a conspirator and is not a means by which a conspirator may introduce exculpatory evidence’ (emphasis deleted)). It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Williams' argument and refusing to admit Westmoreland's statement.” Snider v. State, 304 Ga.App. 64, 695 S.E.2d 383 (May 12, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; no merit to defendant’s contention that he was entitled to present evidence that victim’s father had shown him pornographic movie. Citing Holmes v. South Carolina (May 1, 2006), and Azizi (February 22, 1999), both below. Haywood v. State, 301 Ga.App. 717, 689 S.E.2d 82 (December 16, 2009). At defendant’s trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute, trial court properly excluded evidence of circumstances of co-defendant Clayton’s arrest – namely, that he was arrested in possession of cocaine. “At trial, the state proceeded under the theory that Clayton and Haywood jointly possessed the seized marijuana and cocaine. The fact that Clayton solely possessed drugs when he was arrested two weeks later ‘did not shine any light whatsoever’ on whether Clayton was in exclusive possession of the drugs seized in this case. Nichols v. State, 282 Ga. 401, 403(2), 651 S.E.2d 15 (2007). In other words, testimony that Clayton was found with drugs at an entirely different time and place two weeks after the charged crimes had no ‘logical relation’ to whether Haywood jointly possessed the seized marijuana and cocaine or actively participated in the attempted drug deal at the hotel. Id. at 404(3), 651 S.E.2d 15.”