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purse belonged to Moore. Although Corbin subpoenaed [daughter] Moore to testify, Moore did not appear for trial. [fn] Corbin attempted to introduce evidence of Moore’s drug use through other witnesses. Specifically, Corbin proffered the testimony of her son that Moore had told him that she had ‘got[ten] two eight balls[,]’ which the son interpreted as meaning drugs. Corbin also proffered the testimony of her grandson who testified that Moore told him that she had been awake for ‘a couple’ of days and that ‘she had more drugs she could do in her pocket.” “As a general rule, hearsay evidence of another person’s allegedly inculpatory statements are inadmissible. See Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 72(4) (635 S.E.2d 125) (2006). A trial court may only admit such evidence in ‘exceptional circumstances, i.e., when the hearsay bears “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” and is critical to the defense.’ Id. Though the evidence was challenged on hearsay grounds, Corbin never argued nor presented evidence that exceptional circumstances warranted admission of the statements notwithstanding that they constituted hearsay. Under these circumstances, Corbin forfeited the opportunity to prove this exception and thus the trial court properly excluded the evidence. See State v. Fischer, 230 Ga.App. 613, 614 (497 S.E.2d 79) (1998), overruled on other grounds in Workman v. State, 235 Ga.App. 800 (510 S.E.2d 109) (1998).” Gerlock v. State, 283 Ga.App. 229, 641 S.E.2d 240 (January 8, 2007). In defendant’s trial for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trial court properly excluded proffered evidence that car passenger might have placed the bag of marijuana in the car because he had previously been arrested “in a drug case and was known to be a drug dealer. [fn.] This evidence, however, ‘did not logically tend to prove or disprove either that [Rumph, the proffered alternative perpetrator] committed the crime charged here or that [Gerlock] did not commit the crime.’ Santana v. State, 236 Ga.App. 66, 67(1) (510 S.E.2d 916) (1999). Gerlock himself testified that Rumph did not have a bag with him when he entered the vehicle.” Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 637 S.E.2d 652 (November 20, 2006). Convictions for felony murder and child cruelty reversed; trial court erred in preventing defendant from cross-examining witness about relevant matter, tending to show that witness, not defendant, may have committed the offense. Defendant sought to question witness about prior allegations of child abuse against witness. “ A reasonable inference of a defendant’s innocence is ‘raised by evidence that render[s] the desired inference more probable than the inference would be without the evidence .’ Oree v. State, 280 Ga. 588, 593(5) (630 S.E.2d 390) (2006). Scott’s proposed questioning of Buffington on cross-examination does this; he wished to show that the other adult in the apartment during the period of time that the fatal injuries were inflicted had a history of inappropriate behavior toward her own infant child, including an allegation of physically forceful abuse. He proffered forms with her signature on them to impeach her voir dire testimony that she had not been directed to take parenting classes as a result of the accusation. Further, Buffington was already connected to the corpus delicti; she was apparently the only other adult in the apartment when [child victim] Shaniya’s fatal injuries occurred, and a history of similar actions toward an infant would only connect her further. Id.; compare Azizi v. State, 270 Ga. 709, 714(6) (512 S.E.2d 622) (1999). The exclusion of this line of inquiry cannot be considered harmless. See Oree, supra. A crucial element of Scott’s defense was that Buffington was a likely suspect in Shaniya’s murder, and that the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that she was the true culprit. See OCGA § 24-4-6. While the evidence against Scott was legally sufficient to sustain his convictions even considering OCGA § 24-4-6, … the test for harmless error is whether it is ‘highly improbable’ that the jury’s verdict would have been different if the excluded evidence had been admitted. Oree, supra. Under these facts, it cannot be said that such a result would be ‘highly improbable.’ Accordingly, Scott’s convictions for felony murder and cruelty to a child must be reversed.” Accord, Gilreath v. State , S15A1512, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085257 (March 21, 2016) (murder and related convictions reversed on similar facts, citing Scott ). Distinguished, Dodd v. State , 293 Ga.App. 816, 668 S.E.2d 311 (October 3, 2008) (child molestation victim positively identified defendant, evidence against alternate perpetrator “fails to raise more than a conjectural inference that [alternate perpetrator] committed the crimes.”). Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 635 S.E.2d 125 (September 18, 2006). “Hearsay evidence of another person’s inculpatory statements regarding commission of the crimes for which the defendant is being tried is generally inadmissible, but is admissible in exceptional circumstances, i.e., when the hearsay bears ‘persuasive assurances of trustworthiness’ and is critical to the defense. Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149(3) (476 S.E.2d 252) (1996). Exclusion of hearsay testimony that meets the exceptional circumstances test violates traditional and fundamental standards of due process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297) (1973). After hearing the proffer, the trial court determined the testimony did not fall within the exceptional circumstances that would authorize its admission because it contained no persuasive assurances of trustworthiness.” Proffer here: sister of defendant’s girlfriend would say Brown confessed to crimes while smoking marijuana with her; defendant’s cousin would say he refused to help Brown commit the robbery; Brown’s friend, an inmate, would say Brown admitted the murder to him, but the trial court discounted this