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testimony because the witness denied culpability for offenses he had been convicted of. “After reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court did not err when it excluded the proffered evidence. See Drane v. State, 271 Ga. 849(2) (523 S.E.2d 301) (1999).” Accord, Corbin (July 31, 2007), above; Williams v. State , 295 Ga.App. 249, 671 S.E.2d 268 (November 25, 2008) (alleged out-of-court statement of witness, identifying alternate perpetrator, was properly excluded by trial court.); Martinez v. State , 289 Ga. 160, 709 S.E.2d 797 (April 26, 2011) (no “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” where only connection between witness and declarant “was that they were inmates at the same time at the Clayton County Jail and that they had occasional contact”); Grell v. State , 291 Ga. 615, 732 S.E.2d 741 (October 1, 2012); Matthews v. State , 294 Ga. 50, 751 S.E.2d 78 (November 4, 2013). Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (June 26, 2006). In defendant’s prosecution for murders of three members of the same family, trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffer of evidence that a similar murder was conducted at about the same time. “Evidence of an alternative perpetrator is generally admissible to exonerate a defendant if the evidence relates to a specific accused and does not merely speculate that some unknown person may have committed the crime. Azzizi v. State, 270 Ga. 709(6) (512 S.E.2d 622) (1999). The police officer investigating the fourth murder testified that, although the name of one person had come up during the preliminary investigation, the police had no actual primary suspects for the fourth murder. This testimony, at best, would do no more than cast bare suspicion, and, as such, the trial court properly excluded it. Id.” Accord, Dawson v. State , 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (March 17, 2008); Leslie v. State , 292 Ga. 368, 738 S.E.2d 42 (February 4, 2013). Oree v. State, 280 Ga. 588, 630 S.E.2d 390 (May 17, 2006). Trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of co- defendant’s motive to kill victim, independent of defendant; but error harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. “In Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570(3) (501 S.E.2d 810) (1998), citing Henderson v. State, 255 Ga. 687(1) (341 S.E.2d 439) (1986), and Walker v. State, 260 Ga. 737(1) (399 S.E.2d 199) (1991), we set forth the requirements for admission of evidence implicating another person in the crime at bar: the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence and it must directly connect the other person with the corpus delecti or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature . In Henderson and Walker, this Court ruled that a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence was raised by evidence that rendered the desired inference more probable than the inference would be without the evidence. Evidence in the case at bar that the victim made threats which gave [co-defendant] Daniels, one of the victim’s confessed killers, motive to kill the victim, renders the desired inference (that the victim was killed because Daniels, not Oree, wanted him dead) more probable than the inference would be without the excluded evidence, and directly connected Daniels to the victim’s murder in that he admitted he visited the victim the night the victim was killed because of the victim’s threats. Consequently, the excluded evidence should have been admitted.” Accord, Scott (November 20, 2006), above; Dawson v. State , 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (March 17, 2008); Dodd v. State , 293 Ga.App. 816, 668 S.E.2d 311 (October 3, 2008) (evidence properly excluded as not raising reasonable inference of guilt of alternate perpetrator). Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (May 1, 2006). “[A] criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce proof of third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict.” Defendant was convicted of murder, criminal sexual conduct, burglary and robbery. State presented DNA, fingerprint and other forensic evidence against defendant. Defendant sought to discredit the forensic evidence with allegations of contamination and tampering in an attempt to frame him. Defendant also sought to present witnesses placing another man, White, at the scene and claiming that White had made statements indicating that White, not Holmes, committed the crimes. Supreme Court of South Carolina held that trial court properly excluded this third-party guilt evidence, holding that “where there is strong evidence of [a defendant’s] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the [defendant’s] own innocence.” U.S. Supreme Court reverses, finding that this rule violates the defendant’s right to “‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’” quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). “This right is abridged by evidence rules that ‘infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused’ and are ‘ “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve,”’” quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). The rule in question here is thus prohibited: “[u]nder this rule, the trial judge does not focus on the probative value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, if viewed independently, would have great probative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.” “Just because the prosecution’s evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict, it does not follow