☢ test - Í

that evidence of third-party guilt has only a weak logical connection to the central issues in the case. And where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence is not conceded, the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved for the trier of fact and that the South Carolina courts did not purport to make in this case.” Distinguishes the more common rule followed in Georgia, which is constitutionally acceptable: “See, e.g., 41 C.J.S., Homicide § 216, pp. 56-58 (1991) (‘ Evidence tending to show the commission by another person of the crime charged may be introduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such connection with the crime that they are excluded ’); 40A Am.Jur.2d, Homicide § 286, pp. 136-138 (1999) (‘[T]he accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that another person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is charged .... [Such evidence] may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant’s trial’ (footnotes omitted)),” citing Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573, 501 S.E.2d 810, 813-814 (1998), and numerous other states’ cases. Carr v. State, 279 Ga. 271, 612 S.E.2d 292 (April 26, 2005). “Although a defendant is entitled to introduce relevant evidence tending to show that another person committed the crime for which he is being tried, the evidence ‘must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence, and must directly connect the other person with the corpus delecti, or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature.’ [Cit.] Moreover, ‘[e]vidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another or raises a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another is not admissible.’ [Cit.]” Trial court properly rejected defendant’s proffer of evidence that one of his co-defendants had committed another crime in the same apartment complex. Proffered testimony did not identify perpetrator, nor did it establish similarity of the offenses. Accord, Warner (June 12, 2009), above; Faulkner v. State , 304 Ga.App. 791, 697 S.E.2d 914 (July 6, 2010); Redinburg v. State , 315 Ga.App. 413, 727 S.E.2d 201 (April 6, 2012) (defendant’s proffer that State’s witnesses had committed another offense on same day as offense charged against him didn’t raise a reasonable inference of defendant’s innocence). Bass v. State, 271 Ga.App. 228, 609 S.E.2d 386 (January 6, 2005). Court did not err in refusing to admit photo of man “who allegedly resembles” defendant based on detective’s testimony on cross-examination that he had heard that the man “‘may have been involved’ in the robbery.” “‘Generally, [the] accused may introduce evidence tending to show that another person committed the crime with which he is charged, if a proper foundation is laid, unless the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by actual risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bradford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 568, 569 (420 S.E.2d 4) (1992). ‘This evidence ... must be such proof as directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti, and tends clearly to point out someone besides [the] accused as the guilty person. Evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Croom v. State, 217 Ga.App. 596, 599(3) (458 S.E.2d 679) (1995).’” Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 239, 539 S.E.2d 914 (October 3, 2000). The defendant was charged with and convicted of financial transaction card fraud stemming from the use of an illegally acquired credit card from her boss’s purse. The victim was notified that someone was trying to use her card. The victim went down to the location where the attempted use of the card was made and ask the manager to describe the perpetrators. She then showed the manager a picture of the defendant, and the manager identified the defendant as one of the women who tried to use the card. At trial, the defendant tried to offer photographs of her nieces into evidence to show their resemblances to her and to question the identification made by the store manager. The trial court refused to admit these photographs. Held, the trial court erred in excluding the photographs. Trial court’s error in refusing to admit photographs of defendant’s nieces to show their resemblances to her was harmful, where the sole defense was that another person committed crimes and the store manager’s unreliable identification of the defendant as the individual who attempted to use the victim’s credit card at the store may have been challenged had the jury been shown the photographs of the defendant’s nieces. Distinguished by Allen v. State , 268 Ga.App. 519, 602 S.E.2d 250 (July 15, 2004) (not error to rule out photographs and in-court appearances by two men resembling defendant, who also had committed robberies in the area, where no evidence connecting them to the robberies in question except one photo identification by one victim who retracted that identification when she saw that man and defendant in live line-up together). Sullivan v. State, 242 Ga.App. 613, 530 S.E.2d 521 (March 7, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence that victim was a drug dealer. “Sullivan argued the evidence was admissible to