☢ test - Í

show that Craig's narcotic sales generated cash, which he ‘flashed’ on a regular basis, thereby giving many people a motive to rob him. Sullivan could not, however, point to any person, not already tied to the crime, who knew that Craig carried a large amount of cash. Thus, the trial court refused to allow Sullivan to impugn Craig's character by inquiring into how he obtained his money.” Evidence was not sufficient to raise issue of alternate perpetrator. “[T]o be admissible, the evidence must ‘point out someone besides the accused as the guilty person. Evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of a crime by another, is not admissible.’ (Punctuation omitted.) [ Bell v. State, 235 Ga.App. 825, 826, 510 S.E.2d 589 (1998)]. … Here, the evidence does not raise a reasonable inference of Sullivan's innocence but merely raises conjecture that one of several hypothetical thieves may have been involved in the robbery and kidnapping. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence of Craig's alleged drug dealing.” Drane v. State, 271 Ga. 849, 523 S.E.2d 301 (November 1, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered evidence “that his co-indictee, Willis, confessed his role in the murder to cellmate Marcus Guthrie. The state objected on hearsay grounds. … Willis was unavailable to testify because his murder trial was pending.” “Evidence of a co-indictee's alleged confession is generally inadmissible hearsay. Drane [ v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 455 S.E.2d 27 (1995)]; Guess v. State, 262 Ga. 487(2), 422 S.E.2d 178 (1992). However, another person's confession to a third party may be admitted in the guilt-innocence phase under exceptional circumstances that show a considerable guaranty of the hearsay declarant's trustworthiness. Chambers [ v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)]; Drane, supra. The trial court must determine whether the value and reliability of the tendered hearsay evidence outweigh the harm resulting from a violation of the evidentiary rule. See Chambers, supra at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038; Turner [ v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 154-155(3), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996)]. In Chambers, the hearsay testimony was deemed trustworthy and admissible because the declarant (alleged to be the perpetrator by Chambers) made three spontaneous confessions to close friends shortly after the murder, the confessions were against the declarant's interest, each confession was corroborated by other evidence (including eyewitness testimony to the shooting, a sworn confession by the declarant that was admitted at trial, and evidence that the alleged perpetrator had been seen with the murder weapon), and the declarant was present in the courtroom and available for cross-examination. In a later case, the United States Supreme Court held that the same balancing test must be employed in the sentencing phase for this type of evidence and listed an additional consideration of whether the declarant's alleged confession had been used by the state against the declarant at his trial. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979).” Trial court here properly held that statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability: witness was cellmate with declarant for about a week; inmates have motive to “exaggerate their crimes to appear tougher to their fellow inmates,” and key elements of statement were otherwise uncorroborated. Accord, Brown (March 25, 2011), above; Martinez v. State , 289 Ga. 160, 709 S.E.2d 797 (April 26, 2011) (no “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” where only connection between witness and declarant “was that they were inmates at the same time at the Clayton County Jail and that they had occasional contact”). Rutledge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 1 (March 15, 1999). Trial court properly ruled out cross-examination of the officer about another man who had robbed the same gas station, whom defendant suggested here as an alternative perpetrator, but who didn’t resemble the description given by witnesses to this robbery. “The trial court questioned [Officer] McSwain outside the presence of the jury and heard evidence that Johnson was significantly younger than [victim] Kroger’s attacker and did not walk with a limp. Since Rutledge and [other perpetrator] Johnson did not resemble each other, the trial court concluded that allowing Rutledge to question McSwain about Johnson would establish only that the BP station had been robbed before. Accordingly, the trial court excluded the testimony. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Rutledge to question McSwain about Johnson.” Azizi v. State, 270 Ga. 709, 512 S.E.2d 622 (February 22, 1999). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffer of evidence of another murder “which occurred one month after the victim was murdered and less than two miles away.” “‘Generally, evidence implicating another named individual as the actual perpetrator of the crime is relevant and admissible as tending to exonerate the defendant. Henderson v. State, [255 Ga. 687, 341 S.E.2d 439 (1986)]; Walker v. State, 260 Ga. 737, 738(1), 399 S.E.2d 199 (1991). However, this is not the case where no specific individual is accused and the defendant merely speculates that a person or persons unknown may have had the opportunity to commit the crime. Palmer v. State, 186 Ga.App. 892, 898(3), 369 S.E.2d 38 (1988). “‘The evidence, to be admissible, must be such proof as directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti, and tends clearly to point out someone besides accused as the guilty person. Evidence which can have no other effect than to cast a bare suspicion on another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible....’ [Cit.]” Bradford v. State, 204 Ga.App. 568, 569, 420 S.E.2d 4 (1992).’ Neal v. State, 210 Ga.App. 522, 523(2), 436 S.E.2d 574 (1993). The evidence proffered by Azizi was not such as to directly connect another person to the crime or to clearly point to that person as the