☢ test - Í

murderer. Id. Although there were similarities between the crimes (no forced entry, the victims were beaten, no murder weapon was found), the dissimilarities were far more striking (the victim in the other case was a young, male homosexual who was found partially nude; he was strangled, as well as beaten; his credit cards and automobile were stolen). Evidence of the other crime would have done nothing more than raise a conjectural inference that another person committed the murder. Id. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit it.” Accord, Livingston v. State , 271 Ga. 714, 524 S.E.2d 222 (November 22, 1999); Pace v. State , 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999) (no error where trial court prevented questioning witnesses “about other suspects in the murders … there is no defense proffer that shows another person was reasonably connected to any of the murders.”). Accord, Russell (October 20, 2014), above (citing Azizi). Santana v. State, 236 Ga.App. 66, 510 S.E.2d 916 (January 21, 1999). After marijuana was found in his luggage at the airport, defendant first admitted that the bags were his, but at trial contended that someone must have switched bags with him. At trial, he offered the testimony of a witness that defendant’s traveling companion on this trip had, on a different occasion, “switch[ed] bags with an apparently unsuspecting passenger.” Held, trial court properly excluded this testimony. “While a defendant is entitled to introduce relevant and admissible testimony showing that another person committed the crime for which he is being tried, ‘ the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence, and must directly connect the other person with the corpus delicti, or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature. [Cits.]’ Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573(3), 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998). [Witness] Chandley’s proffered testimony regarding [alternative perpetrator] Weinstein’s involvement in drug smuggling and his ‘setting up’ Santana is mere speculation . She had no knowledge of any of the events surrounding Santana’s trip with Weinstein. In addition, Chandley’s proffered testimony dealt with an incident that occurred one and one-half years earlier. There was no evidence drugs were involved in the prior incident, and it was clear Weinstein did not know and was not traveling with the individual involved in the prior incident. The evidence proffered did not logically tend to prove or disprove either that Weinstein committed the crime charged here or that Santana did not commit the crime. The suggestion that Weinstein may have owned the luggage and its contents was no more than supposition, based on motives which were gleaned from hearsay or inferred from prior acts which did not demand such an inference. See Guess v. State, 264 Ga. 335, 337(5), 443 S.E.2d 477 (1994).” E. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A CRIME New v. State, 270 Ga.App. 341, 606 S.E.2d 865 (November 4, 2004). “New contends that, at most, the evidence shows mere preparation for an armed robbery, not a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Undoubtedly, ‘[m]ere acts of preparation, not proximately leading to the consummation of the intended crime, will not suffice to establish an attempt to commit it.’ [Cit.] In some circumstances, however, preparatory acts can result in criminal attempt. As we have noted: ‘To constitute an attempt there must be an act done in pursuance of the intent, and more or less directly tending to the commission of the crime. In general, the act must be inexplicable as a lawful act, and must be more than mere preparation. Yet it can not accurately be said that no preparations can amount to an attempt. It is a question of degree, and depends upon the circumstances of each case.... The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial. In addition to assuring firmness of criminal purpose, the requirement of a substantial step will remove very remote preparatory acts from the ambit of attempt liability and the relatively stringent sanctions imposed for attempts.’ [Cit.] The fact that further steps needed to be taken before the crime could be completed does not preclude a finding that New took substantial steps toward committing an armed robbery [Cits.]” when he approached a restaurant with a BB pistol and a ski mask, and grabbed the gun when approached by a police officer. Accord, Leaptrot v. State , 272 Ga.App. 587, 612 S.E.2d 887 (March 30, 2005) (giving teenager gifts, touching her leg and asking for sex sufficient to convict of attempted child molestation). Massey v. State, 267 Ga.App. 482, 600 S.E.2d 437 (May 19, 2004). “Massey’s acts, including telephoning a known drug dealer, and driving to the location to make the transaction sufficiently constitute a substantial step under Jackson v. Virginia, to convict Massey of attempting to possess cocaine. Day v. State, 235 Ga.App. 771(1) (510 S.E.2d 579) (1998).” F. AUTHENTICATION See subheading FOUNDATIONS , below G. BATTERED PERSON SYNDROME Pickle v. State, 280 Ga.App. 821, 635 S.E.2d 197 (July 14, 2006). Physical precedent only: trial court erred in excluding defendant’s proffer of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to negate the element of intent in her prosecution for cruelty to children, but error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Defendant sought to show that