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her fear of her husband and desire to protect herself and her children from him drove her to participate in abuse of her daughter. Two members of panel concur in judgment only, would hold that the evidence was not admissible where defendant charged with offenses against a non-batterer victim. Hall v. State, 272 Ga.App. 204, 612 S.E.2d 44 (March 15, 2005). “‘The battered woman syndrome describes a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives. The syndrome does not stand as a separate defense but rather is evidentiary support for a claim of justification under OCGA § 16-3-21(d).’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adame v. State, 244 Ga.App. 257, 258(1) (534 S.E.2d 817) (2000).” Here, counsel was not ineffective for failing to present such a defense; although defendant and her now-deceased husband had a violent history, counsel could establish no pattern of abuse. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (November 8, 2004). “The trial court did not err in permitting Lenore Walker, an expert on the battered women’s syndrome, to explain why [victim] would not have reported instances of abuse and why she dismissed her complaint for divorce and reconciled with Watson. ‘The battered person syndrome is a “complex area of human response and behavior.” Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627(2), 469 S.E.2d 152 (1996). Therefore, expert testimony must be admitted because it supplies an interpretation of the facts which differs from the ordinary lay perception. Johnson v. State, supra at 626(2), 469 S.E.2d 152. An opinion regarding the battered person syndrome, like the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, can “only be based on something more than mere observation.” Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 703(1), 482 S.E.2d 314 (1997).’ Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 292(3), 519 S.E.2d 206 (1999).” Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 596 S.E.2d 582 (May 3, 2004). “The battered person syndrome is not applicable here, since [victim] ‘was not a family member with a history of abusing [Pearson]....’ Freeman v. State, 269 Ga. 337, 339(1), 496 S.E.2d 716 (1998).” Alvarado v. State, 257 Ga.App. 746, 572 S.E.2d 18 (September 24, 2002). Expert testimony on battered person syndrome was admissible “to explain the behavior of a domestic violence victim who does not report abuse or leave the abuser.” Here “[t]he defense attempted to undermine [the victim]’s credibility by cross-examining her about her failure to report the same abuse to the police that she had testified about during the trial.” Defense called witnesses who said victim never seemed scared of defendant. “Under these circumstances, the expert testimony regarding battered person’s syndrome was admissible because the reasons why a battered woman would not leave the abuser or report his abuse are beyond the ken of the average layman.” Accord, Moorer v. State , 290 Ga.App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422 (March 10, 2008); Brown v. State , 325 Ga.App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (November 8, 2013); Gipson v. State , 332 Ga.App. 309, 772 S.E.2d 402 (May 6, 2015). Nguyen v. State, 271 Ga. 475, 520 S.E.2d 907 (September 20, 1999). Affirming Court of Appeals at 234 Ga.App. 185(1), 505 S.E.2d 846 (1998) .Trial court properly excluded proffer of defense evidence on battered person syndrome; While “verbal and/or emotional abuse can warrant the introduction of expert evidence and the giving of a requested charge on battered person syndrome ... we take this opportunity to hold that the psychological abuse inflicted on the accused must have been of such an extreme nature that it engendered in the accused a ‘reasonable belief in the imminence of the victim's use of unlawful force.’ Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 199, 486 S.E.2d 819 (1997). Psychological abuse which humiliates, embarrasses or abases an individual is deplorable, but such abuse, when unaccompanied by other acts or verbal statements giving rise to a reasonable fear of imminent physical harm, cannot alone justify the admission of expert evidence on the battered person syndrome.” Here, “[n]o expert testimony was required to assist the jury in evaluating [defendant’s] self-defense claim because [defendant’s] evidence of verbal abuse could not have instilled in [defendant] a reasonable belief in the imminence of physical abuse at the hands of the stepdaughter or the husband. Therefore, the trial court did not err by preventing [defendant’s] expert from giving his opinion that she suffered from the battered person syndrome.” “[Defendant] sought to introduce expert evidence on [defendant’s] Vietnamese religious beliefs, values and cultural traditions in support of her justification defense. The expert testimony proffered by the defense showed the loss of status, humiliation, and possible adverse spiritual consequences to [defendant] and her family from her husband's failure to maintain [defendant’s] proper position in the household. However, there was no evidence that individuals sharing [defendant’s] cultural background would believe themselves to be in danger of receiving any physical harm as a result of such loss of status and disrespectful treatment.” Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 520 S.E.2d 448 (September 13, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly