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excluded defendant’s proffered expert evidence related to post-traumatic stress disorder. “Defense counsel specifically stated that he sought to introduce the expert testimony to explain Pennie's state of mind after the shooting, not as evidence of battered person syndrome. In granting the motion in limine, the court ruled that the jury could decide the issues before it without the aid of an expert.” “During trial, the court allowed a proffer of the expert evidence outside the presence of the jury. The expert testified that two isolated, unsubstantiated traumatic incidents involving men other than Pittman had caused Pennie to develop post-traumatic stress syndrome as well as certain symptoms of battered person syndrome. Although the expert acknowledged that Pennie experienced no prior history of abuse at the hands of the victim during their six-week relationship, these unrelated incidents caused Pennie to become more fearful of harm than someone who had not experienced the prior traumas. The court again rejected Pennie's argument that the evidence was necessary to explain Pennie's conduct after the shooting. Pennie failed to develop a self-defense claim based on the battered person syndrome. Mobley v. State, 269 Ga. 738, 740(2), 505 S.E.2d 722 (1998); Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 486 S.E.2d 819 (1997); Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996). The court properly determined that expert testimony was not required to assist the jurors in evaluating Pennie's justification defense.” Conviction reversed on other grounds, however. Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 519 S.E.2d 206 (July 6, 1999). At defendant’s felony murder trial, trial court properly declined defendant’s requested charge on battered person syndrome defense; defense must be raised by expert testimony. “Evidence of the battered person syndrome “is admissible to show ‘that the defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense of justification although the actual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide.’” (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, [268 Ga. 196, 199, 486 S.E.2d 819 (1997)]. … The battered person syndrome is a ‘complex area of human response and behavior.’ Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 624, 627(2), 469 S.E.2d 152 (1996). Therefore, expert testimony must be admitted because it supplies an interpretation of the facts which differs from the ordinary lay perception. Johnson v. State, supra at 626(2), 469 S.E.2d 152. An opinion regarding the battered person syndrome, like the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, can ‘only be based on something more than mere observation.’ Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 703(1), 482 S.E.2d 314 (1997). Thus, a defendant who relies upon the battered person syndrome should have an expert witness describe the syndrome, apply that model to the facts shown by the evidence, and opine that the defendant falls within the profile. Johnson v. State, supra at 626(2), 469 S.E.2d 152; Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 74(3), 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983). To make a prima facie showing of self-defense based upon the battered person syndrome, a defendant should present the opinion testimony of an expert as well as independent testimony regarding the historical facts upon which the expert relies. Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 216(2), 367 S.E.2d 541 (1988). See also Mobley v. State, 269 Ga. 738, 740(1), 505 S.E.2d 722 (1998). Although Bishop offered testimony that the victim had shot him in the past, he presented no expert testimony whatsoever. Therefore, he failed to make a prima facie showing of the battered person syndrome, and the trial court correctly refused to give the requested instructions on that syndrome.” Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274, 514 S.E.2d 458 (March 11, 1999). Trial court properly admitted battered person syndrome evidence to explain victim’s failure to seek help. “In Smith [ v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981)] , the Supreme Court concluded that testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome is admissible because the reasons why a battered woman ‘would not leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself, would be such conclusions that jurors could not ordinarily draw for themselves.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id.” Where the defendant is the alleged abuser, the testimony serves “to create a ‘profile’ of both the typical victim and abuser. Such a ‘profile’ suggests to the jurors that the defendant shares the characteristics of the typical abuser and, as such, places the character of the defendant in issue. Sanders [ v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 76, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983)]. Therefore, Georgia courts have limited the State’s ability to use profile testimony against a defendant. See Penson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 253, 255(1), 474 S.E.2d 104 (1996). ‘ Unless a defendant has placed his character in issue or has raised some defense which the profile is relevant to rebut, the state may not introduce evidence of the profile, nor may the state introduce character evidence showing a defendant’s personality traits and personal history as its foundation for demonstrating the defendant has the characteristics of a typical profilist. ’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id.” Although relevant here, profile here improperly placed defendant’s character into evidence. Expert’s “testimony regarding the typical batterer’s drug and alcohol use was not necessary to rebut any defense or issue raised by Parrish . Thus, the trial court erred in failing to limit [expert’s] testimony in this regard.” Evidence was admissible though expert had not examined either defendant or victim. Fact that hypothetical question posed by prosecutor was based on facts not in evidence does not make witness’s testimony inadmissible; ‘the fact that an expert’s opinion may be based in part on facts not in evidence goes to its weight, not its admissibility.’ Roberson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 208, 211(8), 447 S.E.2d 640 (1994).” Expert’s testimony was not improper commentary on victim’s credibility. “Credibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the jurors but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the jury. An expert witness may