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not testify as to his opinion of the victim’s truthfulness.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580, 582(2), 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990). However, the fact that expert testimony indirectly touches upon a witness’ credibility does not render it inadmissible. See Barlow v. State, 270 Ga. 54, 55, 507 S.E.2d 416 (1998). … Thus, the possibility that the testimony may have touched on the victim’s credibility does not render it inadmissible. Id.” Mobley v. State, 269 Ga. 738, 505 S.E.2d 722 (September 14, 1998). Trial court properly excluded defense proffer of opinion evidence on battered person syndrome where record showed no factual basis for expert’s opinion. “The evidence must be more than an expert witness’s opinion that the defendant suffers from the battered person syndrome. Among the factors to consider are evidence of a close personal relationship between the defendant and victim; a pattern of physical, sexual, or psychological abuse; and a reasonable apprehension of harm.” (Footnotes omitted.) If the “evidence does not rise to the level of battering necessary to rely on the battered person syndrome as a basis for a self-defense claim ... the trial court [does] not err in preventing the defendant’s expert from giving her opinion that [the defendant] suffer[s] from the battered person syndrome.” H. BATTERER’S SYNDROME Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 253, 577 S.E.2d 560 (February 24, 2003). “Evidence of a ‘syndrome’ or a ‘profile’ that suggests to the jury that a defendant shares the typical characteristics of a batterer or an abuser is inadmissible unless the defendant ‘has placed [his] character in issue or has raised some defense which the ... syndrome is relevant to rebut.’” Such evidence was admissible to rebut defendant’s defense that shooting was an accident. I. BENCH TRIAL, EVIDENCE AT McRae v. State, 289 Ga.App. 418, 657 S.E.2d 323 (January 31, 2008). “‘[D]uring a nonjury trial, it is presumed that the court is able to sift the wheat from the chaff and select only the legal evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Giang v. State, 285 Ga.App. 491, 493-494(3) (646 S.E.2d 710) (2007).” Trial court expressly stated that it didn’t rely on hearsay admitted during bench trial. Accord, Moore v. State , 319 Ga.App. 696, 738 S.E.2d 140 (February 5, 2013) (judge at bench trial presumed to have ignored unsolicited bolstering by child molestation victim’s grandmother). Miles v. Smith, 239 Ga.App. 641, 521 S.E.2d 687 (August 17, 1999). “In a case where the factfinder is a judge, we assume the judge considers the evidence only for proper purposes and sorts out that which is admissible from that which is not. See Lyles v. State, 221 Ga.App. 560, 562(3), 472 S.E.2d 132 (1996); Foster v. Continental Cas. Co., 141 Ga.App. 415, 418(6), 233 S.E.2d 492 (1977).” Judge here was DPS administrative law judge; superior court erroneously reversed ALJ’s decision upholding defendant’s license suspension for implied consent refusal, based on ALJ’s admission of hearsay at administrative hearing. J. BEST EVIDENCE RULE Note: Expanded under new OCGA § 24-10-1001 et seq. to include recordings and photographs New case! Patch v. State, A16A0524, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3060019 (May 26, 2016). Convictions for computer pornography and child exploitation affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no error in allowing police investigator to testify that he saw defendant on video of online chat. Video recording was destroyed when a computer hard drive crashed before trial; thus the best evidence rule, OCGA § 24-10-1001, didn’t prohibit admission of the testimony because “OCGA § 24-10-1004 provides that ‘[t]he original shall not be required and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph shall be admissible if ... [a]ll originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.’” Suggests that the former case law prohibiting a witness from identifying persons on video unless “the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the video or photograph than is the jury” is probably no longer valid under the new Evidence Code: “Because the foregoing cases are inapposite to the issue before us, it is not necessary for us to consider whether they have any continuing precedential utility or validity following the enactment of the new Evidence Code. But as the Magic 8 Ball often notes, ‘Outlook Not So Good.’ See OCGA § 24-7-701 (a); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 588 (II) (A) (113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469) (1993) (noting the forgiving thrust of the federal rules of evidence and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony’) (punctuation and citation omitted); Ronald L. Carlson and Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence, p. 417 (4 th ed., 2016) (‘Federal Evidence Rule 701, newly embraced in Georgia as part of the 2013 evidence code, permits a wide range of opinions by lay witnesses.’).”