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particular dates.’ State v. Layman, 279 Ga. 340, 341 (613 S.E.2d 639) (2005). To that end, the State must be given the opportunity to present evidence concerning whether the offense dates are capable of being more specifically stated. Moore, 294 Ga.App. at 576-577(2). But ‘[w]here the State [is] reasonably capable of narrowing the range of dates alleged in the indictment, it must do so.’ State v. Layman, 279 Ga. at 341.” Distinguished from general demurrers, which is used when “challenging the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment [and] is appropriate when the indictment is ‘[f]atally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction.’” Delaby, supra . Indictment here, for participating in criminal street gang activity, is sufficient as to both substance and form; contrary to defendants’ argument, indictment adequately alleged existence of gang at time of alleged offenses. Based on Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803 (671 S.E.2d 497) (2009): “the indictment here sufficiently alleged that the criminal street gang was in existence and ongoing at the time of the commission of the enumerated offenses. Moreover, we agree with the State that it was not necessary for the indictment also to contain a specific allegation that the gang existed prior to the commission of any of the enumerated offenses, or to include a specific enumerated offense that was committed prior to the commission of any of the enumerated offenses in this case.” Further, date gang came into existence need not be alleged, since “a date certain was provided for each of the enumerated offenses. Moreover, … the indictment sufficiently alleged that the gang was in existence and ongoing at the time the enumerated offenses were allegedly committed. Based upon these dates, the defendants have all the information they need to formulate a defense that the gang did not exist at the time of each enumerated offense. The trial court's order is accordingly reversed.” Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 692 S.E.2d 379 (March 29, 2010). In defendant’s capital murder trial, defendant waived claim that felony murder count failed to set out all elements of the underlying felony by failing to file special demurrer within ten days of arraignment. “‘The “contention that the felony murder [and firearm counts of the] indictment [are] deficient because [they do] not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of [armed robbery] is, in essence, a special demurrer seeking greater specificity with regard to the predicate felony.” [Cit.]’ Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 309-310(2), 676 S.E.2d 181 (2009). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-110, a special demurrer must be filed within ten days after the arraignment. Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 468, 651 S.E.2d 86 (2007). In this case, Thompson did not file a special demurrer in the trial court. Instead, he raised this issue for the first time orally, at the end of the motion for new trial hearing. ‘The failure to file a timely special demurrer seeking additional information constitutes a waiver of the right to be tried on a perfect indictment. [Cits.]’ Dasher v. State, supra at 310(2), 676 S.E.2d 181. Because Thompson did not file a timely special demurrer, ‘“the ground [has been] waived[.]”’ Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180(2), 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005). See also Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 550(4), 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007) (special demurrer waived).” Accord, Kirt v. State , 309 Ga.App. 227, 709 S.E.2d 840 (March 22, 2011); State v. Wilson , 318 Ga.App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (September 25, 2012); Coleman v. State , 318 Ga.App. 478, 735 S.E.2d 788 (October 29, 2012). State v. Delaby, 298 Ga.App. 723, 681 S.E.2d 645 (July 6, 2009). Trial court properly granted defendant’s special demurrer to indictment for influencing a witness; allegation tracking language of code section by charging that defendant “did knowingly use intimidation,” “did not ‘sufficiently apprise’ Delaby of ‘what he must be prepared to meet at trial’” because it was “generic.” “An indictment must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. ‘The defendant is entitled to know the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable him to prepare for trial.’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Black, 149 Ga.App. 389, 390-391(3) (254 S.E.2d 506) (1979).” Citing Military Circle Pet Center No. 94 v. State, 181 Ga.App. 657 (353 S.E.2d 555) (1987) (term “neglect” was generic in describing animal cruelty); State v. Jones, 251 Ga.App. 192, 193 (553 S.E.2d 631) (2001) (term “visual signal” in charge of fleeing and eluding was inadequate to “allege the manner in which the visual signal was given). “Similarly in this case, the intimidation of a witness could come in a number of ways, none of which is alleged in the indictment.” Newsome v. State, 296 Ga.App. 490, 675 S.E.2d 229 (March 5, 2009). 1. Trial court erred by denying defendant’s special demurrer to accusation for violation of family violence order; “the accusation failed to state any specific acts that violated any specific terms of a family violence order. In fact, the accusation is circular in that it essentially charges Newsome with violating a statute by violating a family violence order in violation of the statute. Thus, the accusation, read in conjunction with the statute, fails to set out the essential elements of the crime or to apprise Newsome of the charges against him.” “[A] defendant who has timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment perfect in form as well as substance. Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 868, 877(2) (534 S.E.2d 182) (2000).” 2. Trial court erred by denying defendant’s special demurrer to accusation for criminal trespass “because the accusation failed to identify with particularity the property of the victim he was alleged to have interfered with and damaged. … It is difficult, if not impossible, to prepare a defense to a criminal trespass charge, or to protect against double jeopardy on such a charge, if a defendant is not sufficiently apprised of the particular property he or she is alleged to have damaged or interfered