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with. Thus, ‘[w]here timely demand is made by special demurrer, the defendant is entitled to have such a definite and particular description of the property as will enable him to know the exact transaction in which the State claims he violated the law.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Traylor, 158 Ga.App. 786, 787 (282 S.E.2d 376) (1981) (larceny). See also Morrow v. State, 17 Ga.App. 116 (86 S.E. 280) (1915) (indictment subject to special demurrer when it failed to identify property owned by the victim that was the basis for the trespass charge).” Wilkes v. State, 293 Ga.App. 724, 667 S.E.2d 705 (September 26, 2008). Where indictment gave detailed description of forged check, but omitted to name owner of account, defendant waived the omission by failing to raise it by special demurrer prior to trial. Exception went merely to form of indictment, as indictment was otherwise specific enough not to be “absolutely void.” Staples v. State , 199 Ga.App. 551, 551-552, 405 S.E.2d 551 (1991). Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 651 S.E.2d 86 (September 24, 2007). Reversing 282 Ga.App. 366, 638 S.E.2d 797 (2006). Trial court and Court of Appeals erred in holding that defendant’s special demurrer to indictment, filed within ten days after arraignment, was untimely. “In 2003, the General Assembly enacted the statute presently codified at OCGA § 17-7- 110, thereby changing the judicially established deadline for the filing of special demurrers from arraignment to 10 days after arraignment.” Supreme Court authority cited by Court of Appeals, requiring demurrers to be filed prior to arraignment – Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005) and Mason v. State, 279 Ga. 636, 619 S.E.2d 621 (2005) – was based on prior law, and does not control cases arising under the new statute. “OCGA § 17-7-110 states clearly that all pretrial motions, including special demurrers, must be filed within 10 days after arraignment. Thus, the General Assembly has rejected the former, judicially created rule that required special demurrers to be filed prior to arraignment in favor of a new rule that sets a uniform deadline for the filing of all pretrial motions in criminal cases. Palmer met the statutory deadline, and the trial court therefore erred in dismissing his special demurrers as untimely.” Accord, Moore v. State , 294 Ga.App. 570, 669 S.E.2d 498 (November 14, 2008). Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149, 646 S.E.2d 676 (June 11, 2007). Trial court erred when it denied defendant’s special demurrer to count of indictment charging defendant with felony murder “‘intentionally and with malice aforethought,’ which obviously should appear in a malice murder charge, not a felony murder charge. See OCGA § 16-5-1. The State could have charged malice and felony murder in the alternative in the same count. See Leutner v. State, 235 Ga. 77, 79(2) (218 S.E.2d 820) (1975). However, the charge at issue here mixed those elements rather than charging them in the alternative.” “[W]e find that the mixing of the elements of malice murder and felony murder constitutes a material defect.” Note, “where a special demurrer points out an immaterial defect, the trial court should strike out or otherwise correct the immaterial defect. Where a special demurrer points out a material defect, the trial court must quash the defective count of the indictment.” Disapproves Bailey v. State, 280 Ga. 884 (635 S.E.2d 137) (2006), “to the extent that Bailey can be construed to hold that a material defect that is not prejudicial to the defendant does not require the quashing of a defective count of an indictment.” Two non-material defects here: failure to state that the murder victim was “a human being” (“we direct the trial court to correct the indictment in light of our discussion above”); and reference to the wrong code section for an offense (concealment of a death) (the trial court “should strike the incorrect Code section from the indictment”). Sanders v. State, 282 Ga.App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (December 11, 2006). “Sanders’s failure to file a special demurrer prior to pleading to the indictment waived his right to a perfect indictment. See Stinson [ v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180(2) (611 S.E.2d 52) (2005)].” Accord, Edmond v. State , 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (May 19, 2008) (quoting Stinson ); Castaneda v. State , 292 Ga.App. 390, 664 S.E.2d 803 (July 2, 2008) ( citing Edmond ); Reed v. State , 291 Ga. 10, 727 S.E.2d 112 (April 24, 2012). Overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013). After 2003 statutory change, demurrers may now be filed within 10 days of arraignment, see Palmer (September 24, 2007), above. Palmer v. State, 282 Ga.App. 366, 638 S.E.2d 797 (November 9, 2006). Reversed, 282 Ga. 466, 651 S.E.2d 86 (September 24, 2007). Croft v. State, 278 Ga.App. 107, 628 S.E.2d 144 (March 7, 2006). Defendant challenges his conviction on indictment for reckless driving, contending that “the indictment failed ‘to particularly and specifically describe that conduct which is alleged to be a crime’ and therefore could not result in a conviction. A contention that a count of the indictment lacks sufficient specificity … is an attack on the form of the indictment, which must be addressed by filing a special demurrer to the indictment . See Stinson v. State , 279 Ga. 177, 180(2) (611 S.E.2d 52) (2005) (special demurrer is avenue to obtain more information on the charged offense); Lowe v. State , 276 Ga. 538, 539(2) (579 S.E.2d 728) (2003)