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(‘[i]f [defendant] wanted greater specificity with regard to the felony that she allegedly committed, her appropriate remedy was a pre-trial special demurrer’); Smith v. State, 249 Ga.App. 39, 42(2) (547 S.E.2d 598) (2001) (‘[a] defendant also may challenge the form of the indictment by special demurrer, alleging that the indictment fails to apprise him sufficiently of the charges against him’). Here, Croft filed no special demurrer in the court below, but raised this matter for the first time on appeal. Croft’s ‘failure to file his special demurrer seeking additional information before pleading not guilty to the indictment constitutes a waiver of his right to be tried on a perfect indictment.’ Stinson, supra. See Smith v. State, 239 Ga.App. 515(1) (521 S.E.2d 450) (1999) (‘[a] special demurrer not filed at or before arraignment is waived’). Only if the defendant is asserting that the defects in the indictment rendered the indictment absolutely void (more in the nature of a general demurrer) may a post-conviction attack on the sufficiency of the accusation be considered on appeal. Wright v. State, 255 Ga.App. 119, 121(2) (564 S.E.2d 522) (2002).” Accord, Christian v. State , 288 Ga.App. 546, 654 S.E.2d 452 (November 21, 2007); Dasher v. State , 285 Ga. 308, 676 S.E.2d 181 (April 28, 2009) (felony murder charge based on aggravated assault “did not set out the elements of the underlying felony of aggravated assault;” defendant waived any defect by failing to file timely special demurrer.); McDaniel v. State , 298 Ga.App. 558, 680 S.E.2d 593 (June 25, 2009); Thompson v. State , 286 Ga. 889, 692 S.E.2d 379 (March 29, 2010) (same as Dasher ). Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). “Hunt’s [special] demurrer was not timely, as it was not filed until after arraignment and no extension of time was obtained from the judge. See Haska v. State, 240 Ga.App. 527(1) (523 S.E.2d 589) (1999); Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1.” Special demurrer can now be filed 10 days after arraignment, see Palmer (September 24, 2007), above. South v. State, 268 Ga.App. 110, 601 S.E.2d 378 (June 10, 2004). On special demurrer prior to trial, defendant was “entitled to an indictment perfect in form and substance.” Trial court should have granted demurrer based on failure to allege exact dates of offenses, where record supported finding that state “‘has failed to show that it cannot determine from the evidence the exact dates of the alleged … offenses.’ [cit.]” “The State simply chose not to list these dates due to the number of alleged acts. This is not a valid excuse for failing to provide South with the dates of the alleged offenses.” Thompson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 878, 534 S.E.2d 151 (April 21, 2000). Conviction for driving without proof of insurance reversed. 1. UTC alleging that defendant drove with “no insurance” charges a violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b), which makes it illegal to “knowingly operate[ ] ... a motor vehicle without effective insurance on such vehicle,” not, as State contends, “OCGA § 40-6-10(a)(1), which makes it illegal to drive with no proof of insurance.” “‘[T]he defendant has the right to rely on the specific manner of committing the crime that is alleged in the indictment,’” quoting Kevinezz v. State, 265 Ga. 78, 81(2)(b), 454 S.E.2d 441 (1995). “We note that, under Georgia law, “the description of the offense charged prevails over any Code section cited.’ (Punctuation omitted.) In re: B.C.G., 235 Ga.App. 1, 3(1), 508 S.E.2d 239 (1998). 2. Where accusation or indictment actually charges commission of an offense, defendant “‘was not required to specially demur to the indictment in order to avoid waiving her right to object to a jury charge on a method of committing the crime that was not specified in the indictment.’ Id. at 82-83(2)(c), 454 S.E.2d 441.” Gilmore v. State, 242 Ga.App. 470, 530 S.E.2d 221 (February 22, 2000). Evidence supported less-safe DUI conviction, but conviction for failure to yield reversed; “the trial court erred in denying Gilmore's motion to quash the citation on the charge of failure to yield and in denying his motion for directed verdict on that charge. Gilmore maintains that the Uniform Traffic Citation charged Gilmore with ‘failure to yield right of way, OCGA § 40–6–72(c).’ [fn] OCGA § 40–6– 72 pertains to stop signs and yield signs, and it includes a number of ways in which the statute may be violated. The UTC is tantamount to a formal accusation. Majia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 432, 433(1), 330 S.E.2d 171 (1985), aff'd, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 834 (1985). ‘Where a crime may be committed in more than one way, the failure to charge the manner in which the crime was committed subjects the indictment or accusation to a proper special demurrer. [Cits.]’ Haska v. State, 240 Ga.App. 527(1), 523 S.E.2d 589 (1999). The UTC charging Gilmore with failure to yield did not inform Gilmore how he violated the statute. Moreover, [Trooper] Fagan admitted on the stand that he should have charged Gilmore with violating OCGA § 40–6–73, not OCGA § 40–6–72, because no ‘yield’ sign was present at the intersection and OCGA § 40–6–72(c) applies only when one is present. It was therefore subject to a special demurrer. Although denominated a motion to quash, the motion filed was a special demurrer, and it was filed before arraignment, as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1. Compare Haska, supra.” Bowen v. State, 242 Ga.App. 37, 528 S.E.2d 553 (January 21, 2000). Child abandonment conviction affirmed, although trial court erred in denying special demurrer to accusation based on failure to state therein whether the child was legitimate or born out of wedlock. “The evidence necessary to sustain an abandonment conviction differs depending on