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whether the abandoned child is alleged to be legitimate or born out of wedlock, since in the latter case the evidence must show not only abandonment but also that the accused is the biological father of the child. [ Pasley v. State, 215 Ga. 768, 770-771, 113 S.E.2d 454 (1960)].” No harm shown, however: “By special demurrer an accused claims, not that the charge in an indictment or accusation is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as would be asserted by general demurrer), but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information. State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 485-486, 238 S.E.2d 38 (1977). Even if a special demurrer making these claims is erroneously overruled prior to trial, on review of the conviction on appeal, the error will be found harmless if the accused was not misled to his prejudice by the claimed imperfection in the indictment or accusation. Id. at 486-489, 238 S.E.2d 38. In the present case, Bowen alleges no prejudice to himself, and none is apparent from the record.” D. DISMISSAL See PROCEDURE – DISMISSAL , below E. DUPLICITOUS/MULTIPLICITOUS Nolley v. State, 335 Ga.App. 539, 782 S.E.2d 446 (February 2, 2016). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s various gang-related offenses (but some charges merged for sentencing). “[T]he portion of [OCGA § 16-15-4(b)] making it unlawful for any person to commit an offense enumerated in OCGA § 16–15–3(1) with the intent to ‘maintain or increase his or her status or position in a criminal street gang’ expresses the Legislature’s intention to create a single crime, committed by a person already a member or associated with the gang, which is proved by showing the person committed the enumerated offense with the intent to maintain or increase status or position in the gang. … We find no statutory basis to conclude that the Legislature intended that proof of intent to ‘maintain’ status or position in the gang would constitute a separate ‘unit of prosecution’ from proof of intent to ‘increase’ status or position in the gang. The State’s indictment charging violation of one offense in two counts (counts 7 and 9) was multiplicitous, and resulted in Nolley being punished twice for a single offense in violation of double jeopardy protections. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433, 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986); see Martin v. State, 189 Ga.App. 483, 496–497, 376 S.E.2d 888 (1988) (multiplicitous indictment and multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy may be addressed and set aside even if not raised on appeal).” Note that OCGA § 16-15-4(b) also prohibits offenses committed “with the intent to obtain or earn membership” in a gang, language not addressed here. Riggs v. State, 319 Ga.App. 189, 733 S.E.2d 832 (October 31, 2012). Indictment for child molestation wasn’t muiltiplicitous; although several counts accused defendant of molestation of the same victim at the same time and place, “each count is based upon different allegations. [fn: Count 2 alleged that Riggs exposed the naked victim to one individual with the intent to arouse and satisfy Riggs's sexual desires. Count 4 charged Riggs with displaying the naked victim to a second individual and spreading the victim's leg's for the purpose of exposing the victim's genitalia. Count 7 alleged that Riggs displayed an explicit video to and in the victim's presence. Count 8 charged Riggs with encouraging one male to engage in sexual acts with the victim. Count 9 charged Riggs with encouraging another male to engage in sexual acts with the victim. Count 10 alleged that Riggs lifted the victim's clothing to expose her genitalia to one male. Count 11 charged Riggs with lifting the victim's clothing to expose her genitalia to a different male. ] In other words, the facts needed to prove each count was entirely different from the other counts, and therefore, the indictment was not multiplicitious.” Christian v. State, 288 Ga.App. 546, 654 S.E.2d 452 (November 21, 2007). Defendant was charged with two counts of theft by taking of cash from an estate; the counts spanned fifteen months and four months, respectively. “Christian contends that the form of the indictment was insufficient in that it … was multiplicitous.” Held, defendant waived this contention by failing to bring it as a special demurrer prior to arraignment. “If a defendant … feels that the indictment is defective as multiplicitous, her appropriate remedy is a pre-trial special demurrer that challenges the form of the indictment. Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 341(1) (638 S.E.2d 791) (2006). See … Martin v. State, 189 Ga.App. 483, 496(10) (376 S.E.2d 888) (1988) (physical precedent only) (pre-trial motion to quash indictment because of multiplicity). A special demurrer challenging the form of the indictment ‘must be filed before pleading not guilty to the indictment; otherwise, the matter is waived. Raising the issue for the first time on appeal as [Christian] has done here is too late.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith, supra, 282 Ga.App. at 342(1). Moreover, regarding the claim of multiplicity, we note that the counts concern substantially separate and distinct periods of time, with Count Two focusing on the theft of the money received by Christian from the sale of the decedent’s residence, which sale took place on [the date dividing the two counts]. We discern no error.” Davis v. State, 285 Ga.App. 460, 646 S.E.2d 342 (May 21, 2007). “Duplicity is the technical fault of uniting two or more offenses in the same count of an indictment, and a duplicitous indictment is subject to demurrer. Hall v. State, 241