☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 454, 459(1) (525 S.E.2d 759) (1999). Because Davis’ duplicity claim is a challenge to the technical form, rather than the validity, of the indictment, she was required to raise it in a special demurrer before she pled not guilty to the indictment. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180 (611 S.E.2d 52) (2005). Davis, however, did not file a special demurrer. Indeed, she has raised this challenge to the form of the indictment for the first time on appeal, and therefore she has waived any such claim of error. See Stinson, supra; Hall, supra. Furthermore, even if Davis had timely challenged the first count of the indictment, it is not subject to demurrer as duplicitous. While it is true that separate and distinct offenses cannot be embraced in one count of an indictment, it is well settled that offenses of the same nature and differing only in degree may be joined in one count of the same indictment. State v. Williams, 247 Ga. 200, 203(2) (275 S.E.2d 62) (1981). The test is whether the acts charged by the indictment relate to only one transaction. Id. at 203-204; Sullivan v. State, 178 Ga.App. 769, 771 (344 S.E.2d 737) (1986). So even if we assume, without deciding, that count one of the indictment does indeed charge both possession with intent to distribute and simple possession based on the block of marijuana found in the van, those offenses may be joined in one count because they are offenses of the same nature that differ only in degree and that relate to only one transaction. See Sullivan, supra (permissible to allege in one count both possession and sale of prohibited drug where same evidence related to both crimes).” Hall v. State, 241 Ga.App. 454, 525 S.E.2d 759 (November 19, 1999). Defendant’s Medicaid fraud conviction affirmed. “[W]hen a crime may be committed in more than one way, it is permissible to incorporate the different methods in one count, conjunctively, as was done here. Lumpkins v. State, 264 Ga. 255(1), 443 S.E.2d 619 (1994); Robinson v. State, 143 Ga.App. 37, 39(3), 237 S.E.2d 436 (1977).” Here, Medicaid fraud “was alleged to have been committed by submitting billings for services that were ‘not medically necessary and in excess of the number of psychological services that were actually provided....’” Boyer v. State, 270 Ga. 701, 512 S.E.2d 605 (February 22, 1999). Accusation charging defendant with reckless conduct and battery, arising out of the same incident, was not duplicitous and thus prohibited by OCGA § 16-1-7(a)(2). “‘An accusation is duplicitous if it joins “separate and distinct offenses in one and the same count.” [Cit.] “Duplicity” is “[t]he technical fault in ... pleading of uniting ... two or more offenses in the same count of an indictment....” [Cit.]’ Peters v. State, 175 Ga.App. 463, 465(1), 333 S.E.2d 436 (1985) (overruled on other grounds, Hogan v. State, 178 Ga.App. 534, 535, 343 S.E.2d 770 (1986)). That has not occurred here. To the contrary, the battery and reckless conduct charges are, properly, in separate counts of the accusation.” F. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING INDICTMENT See JURIES AND JURORS – GRAND JURY/JURORS, below G. FORM OF 1. ALIAS See also subheading MISNOMER, below Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no error in denying special demurrer objecting to reference to alias of co-defendant. “The caption of the indictment referred to [co- defendant] McKinney as ‘Mecco McKinney aka Jesse Chester,’ but during the trial, no witness identified McKinney by that alias, and there was no other evidence presented that he had used that name. Nevertheless, this Court explained long ago that while ‘the appearance of an alias in an indictment might reflect unfavorably on the accused, it is the settled law of this State that the grand jury may so indict the accused, either when he is known by different names or when the grand jury is uncertain as to which of a number of names is his true name. The purpose of giving the name is to identify the accused. If this law is abused by an unjustifiable resort thereto by the grand jury, the accused has opportunity upon the trial to prove that he has never had an assumed name, and that he has never been known by the names given in the indictment aside from that which he admits is his true name.’ Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 110–111 (26 S.E.2d 263) (1943), overruled in part on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84 (90 S.E.2d 664) (1955). See also Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 18 (200 S.E.2d 106) (1973).” “Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the mere mention of an innocuous-sounding alias in the caption of the indictment caused McKinney any harm. Cf. Hawes v. State, 266 Ga. 731, 732–733 (470 S.E.2d 664) (1996) (holding that the inclusion of the alias ‘Stomper’ in the indictment was proper where the defendant was known by that nickname, even though the victim ‘literally was beaten and stomped to death’).” Merneigh v. State, 242 Ga.App. 735, 531 S.E.2d 152 (March 13, 2000). Shoplifting and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to quash indictment showing an alias for defendant. “‘Where the accused is known by different names it is lawful for the indictment to identify the accused by all such names as alias dicta.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Majors v. State, 203 Ga.App. 139, 143(7), 416 S.E.2d 156 (1992). See also Stevens v. State, 247