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similar robbery attempt in Douglas County, occurring a day apart, as part of the res gestae because the Douglas County incident was a continuation of his crime spree that started in Fulton County. See also Horner v. State , 257 Ga.App. 12, 570 S.E.2d 94 (Aug. 9, 2002) (holding that an auto theft in another city that occurred three days before the theft at issue was not a similar transaction but was admissible as circumstances of the arrest and as a relevant part of the defendant’s criminal scheme; thus, even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial). Accord, Rust v. State , 264 Ga.App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (December 19, 2003) (similar armed robbery occurring one hour previously, 10 miles away, in neighboring county properly admissible as res gestae). Davis v. State , 244 Ga.App. 345, 535 S.E.2d 528 (June 7, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion in limine to exclude any reference to his arrest being effectuated by a SWAT team.” The evidence was admissible along with the other “circumstances connected with the arrest.” Benford v. State , 272 Ga. 348, 528 S.E.2d 795 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of the crack cocaine found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest, but erred by admitting evidence of the pistol in his possession. Defendant “was arrested approximately six weeks after the charged crime.” “[T]his has indicated that the admission of evidence which shows the commission of another crime may not automatically be admitted solely on the basis that the evidence was incident to an accused's arrest where the evidence is wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the arrest is remote in time from the charged crime, and the evidence is not otherwise shown to be relevant. See Crosby [ v. State, 269 Ga. 434, 498 S.E.2d 62 (1998)]; Ivester v. State, 252 Ga. 333(2), 313 S.E.2d 674 (1984); Bixby v. State, 234 Ga. 812(1), 218 S.E.2d 609 (1975).” “In the case before us, given the role crack cocaine played in the events leading up to the murder of the victim and the reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the evidence that Benford's motive in murdering the victim was to obtain the victim's drugs or money to purchase the drug from others, we find no error in the trial court's admission of testimony that Benford possessed crack cocaine when arrested. Although the State argues that Benford's possession of a .22 caliber pistol was relevant because Benford killed the victim with a firearm, we find that the admission of this circumstance of Benford's arrest was error because the evidence established that Benford committed the murder using a shotgun which he obtained from a third party; that Benford was arrested approximately six weeks after the charged crime; and no other relevant basis was presented to support the admission of this prejudicial evidence. We conclude, however, that the admission of this circumstance of Benford's arrest was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Benford's guilt. Crosby, supra, 269 Ga. at 435(3), 498 S.E.2d 62.” Davis v. State , 272 Ga. 327, 528 S.E.2d 800 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed as to Davis, reversed as to co-defendant Hill based on Bruton violation. 1. Witness’s testimony that he urged victim to leave his house after confrontation with Davis “because he knew Davis was ‘fixing to go home and get something’” was not improper character evidence. “Gun ownership and the custom of carrying a gun do not, by themselves, impute bad character. Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga.App. 14, 17, 512 S.E.2d 640 (1999). Further, [witness] Henderson's statement was relevant to his testimony that he asked [victim] Barlow to leave because he was attempting to break up an escalating argument. It was additionally relevant to other testimony that Davis did, in fact, return with a gun and two armed men.” 2. No improper character evidence where officer testified that defendant “was intoxicated and obstreperous” when arrested on unrelated charges. “Because the gun seized from [co-defendant] Hill during this arrest was highly relevant to the state's case, limited testimony regarding other circumstances of this arrest was not error, even though it may have incidentally placed Hill's character in issue. Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 748, 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997). Further, it has been held that the consumption of alcohol by an adult is irrelevant to the issue of character. Mungin v. State, 183 Ga.App. 290(3), 358 S.E.2d 673 (1987).” Tanner v. State , 243 Ga.App. 640, 533 S.E.2d 794 (April 17, 2000). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed; where drugs were found on defendant as he was being booked into jail on a different offense, trial court properly admitted evidence of the original offense – here, “loitering in an area known for drug activity” – as part of the res gestae. Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga.App. 561, 530 S.E.2d 255 (March 1, 2000). Theft by receiving conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant was unable to produce proof of ownership to officer at time of arrest. Contrary to defendant’s argument, such evidence was not improper comment on defendant’s silence under Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 629–630(5), 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991). “This court has not interpreted Mallory … to bar evidence otherwise admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime. Boykin v. State, 240 Ga.App. 402, 403–404(1), 523 S.E.2d 605 (1999). ‘As a general rule, all the circumstances connected with a defendant's arrest are admissible as a part of the res