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gestae.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 682(4), 513 S.E.2d 235 (1999). When such evidence is relevant for the purpose of showing the circumstances of the arrest, it need not be excluded simply because it is prejudicial. Id. In this case, Mullinax was charged with receiving stolen property, and the fact that he did not have proof of ownership when arrested was very relevant to the issues at trial. This was not a matter of silence; a police officer conducting a traffic stop has a right to request and examine such documents as a driver's license, proof of insurance, and registration of the vehicle and may run a computer check of these documents. Sutton v. State, 223 Ga.App. 721, 723, 478 S.E.2d 910 (1996); accord Williams v. State, 233 Ga.App. 70, 71(1), 503 S.E.2d 324 (1998).” Moore v. State, 242 Ga.App. 208, 529 S.E.2d 210 (February 2, 2000). Convictions for burglary and theft by taking of motor vehicle affirmed; no improper character evidence “in allowing the state to question a police officer about traffic charges filed against Moore following the accident” which led to defendant’s arrest. The charges included DUI and suspended license charges. “Every aspect of the criminal transaction relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial, even if the defendant's character is incidentally placed in issue. Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 457(1), 448 S.E.2d 177 (1994). That Moore was charged with having committed traffic offenses while driving the truck was part of the circumstances surrounding his arrest for burglary and theft by taking a motor vehicle; property taken in the burglary was recovered at the scene of the accident, and the accident involved the truck which was the subject of the theft by taking charge. There was no error. See generally Shields v. State, 203 Ga.App. 538, 539(1), 417 S.E.2d 168 (1992); Barnes v. State, 163 Ga.App. 61(1), 293 S.E.2d 717 (1982).” Accord, Veasey v. State, 244 Ga.App. 102, 534 S.E.2d 129 (April 19, 2000) (in shoplifting prosecution, no error in admitting evidence that defendant was driving on suspended license when arrested). Blaylock v. State, 242 Ga.App. 195, 529 S.E.2d 203 (February 2, 2000). Conviction for selling cocaine affirmed; trial court properly admitted “evidence that a crack cocaine pipe was found on [defendant’s] person at the time of his arrest.” “‘Articles found in the control of the defendant at the time or near the time of arrest are admissible as circumstances connected with the arrest of the defendant. Surrounding circumstances constituting part of the res gestae may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact, and their admissibility is within the discretion of the trial court. All circumstances surrounding an arrest are admissible for whatever value the jury desires to place on them.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kirk v. State, 210 Ga.App. 440, 443(1), 436 S.E.2d 553 (1993). See also Fuqua v. State, 183 Ga.App. 414, 419(1)(c), 359 S.E.2d 165 (1987).” Accord, Carter (April 9, 2004), above. Cox v. State, 242 Ga.App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (January 28, 2000). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; evidence that defendants used marijuana just before the assault was properly admitted. “Evidence as to whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time a crime was committed is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible as such even though it may incidentally place the defendant's character in evidence. Ramsey v. State, 233 Ga.App. 810, 812(2), 505 S.E.2d 779 (1998).” Hamilton v. State, 242 Ga.App. 77, 528 S.E.2d 843 (January 25, 2000). Convictions for selling cocaine and related offense affirmed; trial court properly admitted confidential informant’s testimony “that he had ‘found out that Roy Hamilton was selling cocaine out of a residence on Greenough Road.’” “The evidence at issue was properly admitted to explain the circumstances leading to Hamilton's arrest. Sledge v. State, 223 Ga.App. 488(1), 477 S.E.2d 898 (1996) (confidential informant's testimony that defendant was on a list of people from whom drugs could be purchased deemed admissible to explain circumstances leading to defendant's arrest); Carson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 534, 535(4), 431 S.E.2d 156 (1993) (officer's testimony that he sought out defendant on the night in question because defendant was a potential target in a drug investigation held admissible to explain circumstances leading to defendant's arrest); Frazier v. State, 195 Ga.App. 599, 600(4), 394 S.E.2d 396 (1990) (officer's testimony that he was told defendant would be able to supply him with cocaine held admissible to explain circumstances leading to defendant's arrest).” Martinez v. State, 241 Ga.App. 863, 528 S.E.2d 294 (January 19, 2000). Conviction for armed robbery affirmed; trial court properly allowed detective “to testify that Martinez was taken into custody on an outstanding warrant for an unrelated charge . … This court has held consistently that circumstances surrounding an arrest may be admitted as part of the res gestae, notwithstanding that they incidentally place the defendant's character in issue. Samples v. State, 234 Ga.App. 8, 10(1)(a), 505 S.E.2d 813 (1998); see Humphries v. State, 154 Ga.App. 596(2), 269 S.E.2d 90 (1980).” Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 698, 523 S.E.2d 866 (November 15, 1999). Defendant’s malice murder conviction reversed on other grounds; “because appellant's comments about her marijuana usage were relevant to explain why she went with the victim into the woods, the statements were admissible. Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538(16), 331 S.E.2d 561 (1985) (if