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evidence is relevant and material, it is not inadmissible because it incidentally puts defendant's character in issue).” Gagnon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 754, 525 S.E.2d 127 (November 10, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; no error in trial court’s admission of a knife and handcuffs possessed by defendant at time of offense, though not used in the offense. “Although Gagnon is correct that there was no testimony that he used or displayed the knife or the handcuffs, this court has upheld the admission of the accused's possessions as part of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Wilson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 818, 819, 476 S.E.2d 97 (1996); Evans v. State, 209 Ga.App. 340, 342(4), 433 S.E.2d 426 (1993).” Ruiz v. State, 240 Ga.App. 7, 522 S.E.2d 503 (September 13, 1999). At defendant’s trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, trial court properly allowed evidence that drugs were found as defendant was being arrested for probation violation. “That Detective Becker and other officers were going to the motel to arrest Ruiz was admissible as part of the res gestae. See Brooks v. State, 199 Ga.App. 525(1), 405 S.E.2d 343 (1991); compare Racquemore v. State, 204 Ga.App. 88(2), 418 S.E.2d 448 (1992). ‘[E]vidence otherwise admissible does not become inadmissible because it incidentally puts the defendant's character in issue. [Cit.]’ Brooks, supra at 526(1), 405 S.E.2d 343.” Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99, 515 S.E.2d 836 (May 17, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant had stolen a gun the day before the shooting. “Although the State was unable to present direct evidence that the weapon used to shoot Ryan was the one which Bryant stole in Summerville, there was circumstantial evidence of that fact, in that the caliber of both guns was the same and there was only a relatively short interval between the theft of the gun and the homicide in Atlanta. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Bryant's commission of the earlier theft ‘was clearly relevant ... to show where the murder weapon came from.’ Fleming v. State, 269 Ga. 245, 248(7), 497 S.E.2d 211 (1998). See also King v. State, 230 Ga. 581, 582(2), 198 S.E.2d 305 (1973); Hall v. State, 163 Ga.App. 515, 517(5), 295 S.E.2d 194 (1982). Compare Carter v. State, 261 Ga. 344, 345(3), 404 S.E.2d 432 (1991).” Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (February 26, 1999). At defendant’s armed robbery trial, trial court properly admitted evidence of circumstances of defendant’s arrest, restricting reference to fact that defendant was arrested for offenses not on trial. “Prior to admitting any evidence as to defendant’s arrest, the trial court conducted a hearing during which the testimony to be submitted in regard to the arrest was limited. Consequently, the jury heard only that an officer went to an address to back up another on a 911 call and, based on information provided by witnesses, went to a certain apartment to find defendant where defendant attempted to flee. It was not error to allow an officer to testify concerning defendant’s attempt to flee at the time of his arrest. Claypool v. State, 188 Ga.App. 642-643(2), 373 S.E.2d 765 (1988). Furthermore, while the general rule permits admission of evidence establishing the commission of other crimes when such are within the circumstances connected with an accused’s arrest ( Wright v. State, 210 Ga.App. 616, 617, 436 S.E.2d 783 (1993)), the trial court imposed a more restrictive standard and did not allow the State to show that police went to Bowen Homes in response to a robbery call or that defendant was arrested because he was a robbery suspect. Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding the arrest were properly admitted since defendant’s flight was relevant to show his state of mind and consciousness of guilt. Newman v. State, 239 Ga. 329, 330, 236 S.E.2d 673 (1977); Bixby v. State, 234 Ga. 812, 813-814(1), 218 S.E.2d 609 (1975).” Accord, Allen v. State , 325 Ga.App. 752, 754 S.E.2d 795 (February 18, 2014). Russell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 645, 512 S.E.2d 913 (February 24, 1999). At defendants’ armed robbery trial, no error where “an officer testified that the truck in which Russell and Steele were riding when they were stopped was stolen.” “‘“[W]here evidence is relevant for the purpose of showing flight or the circumstances of arrest, it will not be excluded because it incidentally shows the commission of another crime.” [Cits.]’” quoting Russell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 546, 550 (6), 497 S.E.2d 36 (1998). Accord, Simmons (January 25, 1999), below. Eackles v. State, 270 Ga. 558, 512 S.E.2d 635 (February 22, 1999). “The trial court did not err in denying Eackles’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the DeKalb County car chase that immediately preceded his arrest. The evidence was relevant, as (1) it helped to put in context Eackles’s inculpatory statement to police officers, ‘What’s the matter? Haven’t you ever seen a murderer before?’; and (2) it directly showed Eackles’s flight from law enforcement officers. Renner [ v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 397 S.E.2d 683 (1990)]. The facts attending an arrest, if otherwise relevant, are generally admissible during a criminal trial . Ivester v. State, 252 Ga. 333, 335, 313 S.E.2d 674 (1984).”