☢ test - Í

Jones v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 511 S.E.2d 883 (February 9, 1999). At defendant’s trial for armed robbery, evidence of a crack pipe found in defendant’s vehicle was properly admitted as part of the res gestae without compliance with similar transaction rules. “‘Evidence discovered in [defendant’s vehicle], implicating him in [an uncharged drug offense], was evidence of the res gestae and as such is expressly excluded from the procedural requirements applicable to separate but similar crimes. [USCR] 31.3(E); Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 747(1), 425 S.E.2d 865 (1993). Substantively, the State is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae and such evidence is not rendered inadmissible despite the fact that the character of the accused is incidentally implicated. Chambers v. State, 250 Ga. 856, 859(2), 302 S.E.2d 86 (1983).’ Galbreath v. State, 213 Ga.App. 80, 83(3), 84, 443 S.E.2d 664 (1994).” Arnold v. State, 236 Ga.App. 380, 511 S.E.2d 219 (January 27, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for child molestation, trial court properly admitted evidence of all acts committed during the molestation, not just those described in the indictment. “These acts were not similar transactions, but were part of the res gestae of the charged crimes, and as such, no prior notice was necessary. ‘The state is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of the crime. Even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. This is true even if the defendant's character is incidentally placed in issue.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 208(5), 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992); see also Bowman v. State, 184 Ga.App. 197-198(2), 361 S.E.2d 58 (1987).” This is true even though the evidence did not specify that that acts occurred at the same time as those charged: “A reasonable inference from the testimony was that these acts occurred at the same time as the charged offenses.” Accord, Mathis v. State , 299 Ga.App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (July 31, 2009) (witness testified that defendant said, “don’t stop the car, because he wasn’t going back to jail.”). Simmons v. State, 236 Ga.App. 83, 510 S.E.2d 925 (January 25, 1999). Trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant was found in a stolen car when he was arrested for armed robbery. The robbery was not related to the theft of the vehicle. “The evidence of the defendant’s presence in the stolen car was part of the circumstances surrounding the accused’s arrest. ‘All circumstances surrounding an arrest are admissible for whatever value the jury desires to place on them.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 818, 819, 476 S.E.2d 97 (1996). ‘Where evidence is relevant for the purpose of showing the circumstances of the arrest, it will not be excluded merely because it incidentally shows the commission of another crime. Although evidence may incidentally put character in issue or may be prejudicial, it may be admitted if otherwise relevant.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Franklin v. State, 224 Ga.App. 578, 579(3), 481 S.E.2d 852 (1997). Here, the evidence shows that the defendant exited a stolen car and robbed Williams at gunpoint. Only hours later, during a police pursuit of the same stolen car, the defendant jumped out of the car while it was still moving. The evidence of the stolen car was, thus, relevant and admissible.” Accord, Russell (February 24, 1999), above. 3. CURATIVE INSTRUCTION/ACTION Wynn v. State, 332 Ga.App. 429, 773 S.E.2d 393 (June 8, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; testimony that raised defendant’s character, even where objectionable, didn’t rise to the level of a due process violation. Evidence here included references to other offenses by both lay witnesses and officers, in addition to similar transactions approved for admission by the court. One victim testified that defendant’s family members came to her workplace after his arrest. Officers mentioned that defendant had outstanding warrants for other offenses, including robbery, to explain why they were looking for him and chased him. The trial court, however, sustained defendant’s objections to some of the evidence, and instructed the jury that defendant was on trial only for the offenses alleged in the indictment. It also gave a limiting instruction on similar transaction evidence. “Considering the trial court's instructions to the jury, including the curative instructions …, the fact that evidence related to the events leading to Wynn's arrest was properly before the jury, and the overwhelming evidence of Wynn's guilt, we cannot agree that Wynn's right to due process was violated by the admission of bad character evidence.” Wallace v. State, 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to alleged character evidence by failing to object to curative action taken by trial court. Alleged character evidence here: co-defendant/State’s witness Eison testified that she and co-defendant Aikens “did not want Wallace to know where they went after the murder, [because] they ‘don't trust [Wallace].’” Curative action: mistrial denied, but trial court “cautioned the prosecutor to ‘steer clear of that area.’” “Because Wallace failed to renew his motion for mistrial following the trial court's cautionary direction to the prosecutor and instead announced his decision not to request any further corrective action, Wallace has waived this issue on appeal. [Cits.] Even if the trial court's warning to the prosecutor did not amount to corrective action that triggered an obligation on Wallace's part to renew his motion for