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evidence, and (4) a reasonable probability exists that disclosure of the evidence would have altered the outcome of the proceedings. Carroll v. State, 222 Ga.App. 560, 561, 474 S.E.2d 737 (1996). All four of these factors exist in the instant case.” The evidence was in possession of the State even if the DA wasn’t aware of it (disputed here). “Here, the GBI laboratory was fully involved in the investigation of this case in that it was responsible for testing not only Smith's blood and urine, but also Harridge's blood. Moreover, both the medical examiner and the prosecutor were completely dependent on the crime lab for determining the amount of drugs and alcohol present in Smith's and Harridge's bodies. Because the GBI laboratory was part of the prosecution team …, we find that the state had possession of the test results showing drugs in Smith's urine.” The evidence was favorable to the defense. “ In a vehicular homicide case, ‘the conduct of the decedent, whether negligent or not, is material to the extent that it bears upon the question of whether under all the circumstances of the case the defendant was negligent, or, if negligent, whether the decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury, or whether the injury or death resulted from an unavoidable accident.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. State, 236 Ga.App. 825, 829(2), 513 S.E.2d 27 (1999).” Defendant couldn’t otherwise obtain the evidence. Although State argues that it offered to let the defense conduct its own testing of deceased’s blood, “[t]he question here is not whether Harridge with reasonable diligence could have had the blood and urine samples tested himself, but whether he could have, through reasonable diligence, obtained the GBI crime lab's preliminary test results showing cocaine and marijuana in Smith's urine. As the GBI toxicologist testified, Harridge could not have gotten those test results, which were available only to the prosecution.” Miller v. State, 236 Ga.App. 825, 513 S.E.2d 27 (February 22, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for first degree vehicular homicide despite evidence that victim was riding a bicycle in the middle of the roadway at night, wearing dark clothing. “In cases such as McNabb v. State , 180 Ga.App. 723, 725(4), 350 S.E.2d 314 (1986) and Watkins v. State, 191 Ga.App. 87, 89(3), 381 S.E.2d 45 (1989), we have recognized that the vehicular homicide statute requires the State to establish a causal connection between the defendant’s violation of the DUI or reckless driving statute and the victim’s death. In this case, Miller was convicted of causing the victim’s death through violation of OCGA § 40- 6-391(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive. It is not required that the person actually commit an unsafe act. Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 168(2), 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994). By their terms, OCGA §§ 40- 6-391(a)(1) and 40-6-393(a) require the State to prove only that the intoxicated driver caused the victim’s death as a result of driving under the influence to the extent it was less safe for him to drive . [fn: The majority of courts in other states which have been presented with the question have held that their vehicular homicide statutes require proof of a causal connection only between the defendant’s act of driving and the victim’s death rather than between the defendant’s intoxication and the death.(Cits.) ] Nevertheless, negligence by the defendant in operating his vehicle and the behavior of the victim remain relevant. In vehicular homicide cases, the State must prove that the defendant’s conduct was the ‘legal’ or ‘proximate’ cause, as well as the cause in fact, of the death. See Johnson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 433, 434(1), 317 S.E.2d 213 (1984) and cits. [Cits.] If in a given case the injury complained of did not flow naturally and directly from the wrongful act or omission attributed to the defendant, or could not reasonably have been expected to result therefrom, or would not have resulted therefrom but for the interposition of some independent, unforeseen cause, the defendant’s such antecedent wrongful act or omission would not be the proximate cause of the injury complained of. [Cits.] Cain v. State, 55 Ga.App. 376, 381-382, 190 S.E. 371 (1937). Although contributory negligence, as such, is not a defense in a vehicular homicide case, ‘the conduct of the decedent, whether negligent or not, is material to the extent that it bears upon the question of whether under all the circumstances of the case the defendant was negligent, or, if negligent, whether the decedent’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury, or whether the injury or death resulted from an unavoidable accident. [Cits.] Id. at 382, 190 S.E. 371.” “ Criminal negligence could be found in defendant’s intentionally driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for him to drive, even if the victim’s death was accidental and not proximately caused by the defendant. See Trippe v. State, 73 Ga.App. 322, 323(1), 36 S.E.2d 121 (1945).” XII. PLEAS A. ALFORD McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 782 S.E.2d 21 (January 19, 2016). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw negotiated guilty pleas to murder and firearm possession by a convicted felon. Contrary to defendant’s argument, an Alford plea need not be “premised upon his acknowledgment of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to convict him. … [A] defendant’s acknowledgment of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict is not a prerequisite for the trial court to accept a guilty plea. So long as ‘a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt,’ the trial court may accept a guilty