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sentence in exchange for his guilty plea to a specified crime. Parole eligibility may be a factor which the defendant should consider in bargaining for a recommended sentence, but the trial court is entitled to presume that a defendant has apprised himself of such collateral consequences before agreeing to accept a certain sentence in exchange for his guilty plea .’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bess v. State, 235 Ga.App. 372, 373, 508 S.E.2d 664 (1998).” 2. Trial court did not “impermissibly interject herself into the plea negotiations” nor “judicially coerce” defendant’s plea merely because it rejected nolle pros and negotiated plea to lesser charges. “It appears from the record before us that the trial court was simply following the statute pertaining to the entry of a nolle prosequi: ‘After an examination of the case in open court and before it has been submitted to a jury, the prosecuting attorney may enter a nolle prosequi with the consent of the court.’ OCGA § 17-8-3. ‘When a recommendation is made that an indictment be nol-prossed, it is within the discretion of the trial court whether to follow the recommendation. [Cit.]’ State v. Davis, 159 Ga.App. 537, 538(1), 284 S.E.2d 51 (1981). Wilcox has neither enumerated as error nor argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the state’s request to enter the nolle prosequi. Further, the court was not required to accept a plea to a reduced charge simply because the state was so inclined. See Echols v. State, 167 Ga.App. 307, 306 S.E.2d 324 (1983). Although the court’s decision may have been influential in Wilcox’s decision to plead, we can not equate it with actual participation in plea negotiations. See Skomer v. State, 183 Ga.App. 308, 358 S.E.2d 886 (1987).” Accord, Vedder v. State , 241 Ga.App. 578, 527 S.E.2d 249 (December 16, 1999) (“Because Vedder had not filed an effective demand for speedy trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to enter a nolle prosse.”) King v. State, 270 Ga. 367, 509 S.E.2d 32 (December 4, 1998). Reversing 226 Ga.App. 576, 486 S.E.2d 904 (1997); trial court erred by denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas to misdemeanor suspended license and false name charges in state court. Announces new rule requiring a “verbatim” record of guilty plea hearings in state courts “when a defendant is to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.” “[R]equiring a verbatim record is the best method for ensuring that the state can meet it burden of proving the voluntariness of the plea.” Also, “verbatim records promote judicial economy by facilitating appellate review and possibly forestalling collateral proceedings.” “By this opinion, we do not intend to restrict trial courts to any particular method for producing a record, so long as it is verbatim.” Three justices dissent, noting the absence of the word “verbatim” from Uniform State Court Rule 33.11, in contrast to Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11. See also Williams (November 2, 2015), above (verbatim record not required in state court where “additional incarceration” doesn’t result). L. WITHDRAWAL See POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – PLEAS, WITHDRAWAL OF, below XIII. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF/APPEALS Note: Habeas corpus procedure is beyond the scope of this work. A. APPEAL/MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, BY FUGITIVE DEFENDANT Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga.App. 394, 657 S.E.2d 307 (January 30, 2008). Defendant’s appeal dismissed where defendant became a fugitive from justice, failing to serve his sentence, after his notice of appeal was filed. “Because Mohamed did not report to jail as ordered, and cannot presently be located, his “flight constitutes an open defiance of the authority of the courts of this state, and operates to divest [him] of the right to appeal the judgment of the [state] court.” (Citation omitted.) Life For God’s Stray Animals v. New North Rockdale County Homeowners Assn., 256 Ga. 338(1) (349 S.E.2d 184) (1986). ‘The public policy of this state is to deter escapes.’ Gilbert v. State, 188 Ga.App. 602 (373 S.E.2d 668) (1988), quoting Blassingame v. State, 155 Ga.App. 235, 236 (270 S.E.2d 399) (1980). Accord Hall v. State, 271 Ga.App. 302 (609 S.E.2d 653) (2005). In accordance therewith, we have held in several cases that fugitives from justice lose their right of appeal, whether they escape after filing their notice of appeal, Saleem v. State, 152 Ga.App. 552 (263 S.E.2d 490) (1979) (a defendant who escapes after filing a notice of appeal loses his right of appeal); Sanders v. State, 242 Ga.App. 743, 744(1) (531 S.E.2d 170) (2000) (same), or are unable to file a timely notice of appeal because of their status as a fugitive. Id.; Saleem, supra. Even though Mohamed had not escaped from custody and his notice of appeal was filed timely, he should not be treated differently from a defendant who escaped from custody. Mohamed flagrantly disobeyed the court’s order to report to jail; thus, like an escapee, he is not entitled to retain his right to appeal. See Hall, supra (because defendant was a fugitive from justice when his original notice of appeal was filed, amended notice of appeal filed after his capture did not revive his previously waived right of appeal). ‘When one becomes a fugitive from justice, so long as he remains so he forfeits all right to have the aid of the courts in reviewing errors claimed to have occurred in connection with his case, and upon being apprised of his escape or flight it is the duty of this court to dismiss his appeal.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hall, supra. Accordingly, Mohamed’s appeal is dismissed.” Accord, Harper v. State , 300 Ga.App. 25, 684 S.E.2d 96 (September 2, 2009) (trial court properly dismissed motion for new trial where defendant was a fugitive during the entire time when he could have filed it, although defendant was