☢ test - Í

Rehberger v. State, 267 Ga.App. 778, 600 S.E.2d 635 (May 19, 2004). Defendant was only entitled to challenge his sentence as void once; claims in his second such motion were waived by failure to file them in his first motion, where he had the opportunity to do so. “Therefore, Rehberger’s arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” State v. Hart, 263 Ga.App. 8, 587 S.E.2d 164 (August 28, 2003). “Except as provided by statute, a sentencing court has no power to modify a valid sentence of imprisonment after the term of court in which it was imposed has expired.” This does not limit, however, the court’s “inherent power to correct its records at any time ‘to show the true intent of the sentencing court at the time the original sentence was imposed.’” Sentence of incarceration of up to 27 months, but no more than concurrent federal sentence, was invalid as an indeterminate sentence under OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1). Remanded for re-sentencing. Brown v. State, 262 Ga.App. 659, 586 S.E.2d 343 (July 18, 2003). “[T]he trial court may correct a sentence the law does not allow at any time.” Trial court properly corrected defendant’s void sentence two years after its entry. Accord, Phillip v. State , 313 Ga.App. 302, 721 S.E.2d 214 (December 14, 2011) (trial court erred in denying motion to correct void sentence because it was filed outside term of court in which sentence entered); Simmons v. State , 315 Ga.App. 82, 726 S.E.2d 573 (March 22, 2012); Robbins v. State , 326 Ga.App. 812, 757 S.E.2d 452 (April 3, 2014) (“a sentencing court retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence at any time,” but this one wasn’t void). Syms v. State , 244 Ga.App. 21, 534 S.E.2d 502 (May 4, 2000). Denial of motion to vacate void sentence reversed; “Syms could not be guilty both of theft by taking the credit cards and theft by receiving the same credit cards after they were stolen by someone else. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 855(1), 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992). Therefore, as a matter of law, the crimes are mutually exclusive, and Syms could not be sentenced on both crimes, even if he pled guilty to both. Id. Since such sentences were void ab initio, the trial court had both the jurisdiction and the obligation to grant Syms' motion to vacate the sentences. See Manry v. State, [226 Ga.App. 445, 446, 487 S.E.2d 80 (1997)].” Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 686, 523 S.E.2d 857 (November 15, 1999). Convictions for kidnapping with injury and related offenses affirmed. 1. “[A] direct appeal does lie from the denial of a petition attacking a sentence based upon the allegation that it is void,” overruling Taylor v. State , 213 Ga.App. 217, 445 S.E.2d 577 (1994). 2. “[T]he failure to hold a presentece hearing in a non-death penalty case does not render a sentence void.” O’Neal v. State, 238 Ga.App. 446, 519 S.E.2d 244 (June 7, 1999). Defendant can’t complain about “illegal” sentence “because he was sentenced to less than the maximum allowable sentence even though the State indicted him as a recidivist. O'Neal is correct that he was sentenced to a shorter term of confinement than is mandated by OCGA § 17-10- 7(a). … But as recognized by the trial court, the error was a benefit, and he cannot complain. Murphy v. State, 203 Ga.App. 152, 155(3), 416 S.E.2d 376 (1992) (Full concurrence as to Division 3.) The trial court did not err in denying O'Neal's motion to correct an illegal sentence.” XIV. PROBATION A. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL See ATTORNEYS – APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL – PROBATION REVOCATION, above B. CONDITIONS OF PROBATION, GENERAL AND SPECIAL Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (November 24, 2014). In civil case challenging operation of misdemeanor probation system, judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Superior Court erred by ruling that OCGA § 42-8-30.1 restricts the conditions that may be imposed on probationers in misdemeanor cases, including electronic monitoring. “Electronic monitoring is a condition of probation which does not necessarily require explicit statutory authority in order to be imposed. See Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga.App. 627, 628, 436 S.E.2d 793 (1993). OCGA § 17–10–1(1)(a) permits a sentencing judge to suspend or probate all or any part of a defendant's sentence ‘under such rules and regulations as the judge deems proper.’ Judges operating within Georgia's private probation statutory framework retain this power. See OCGA § 42–8–100(c) and (e). The only restriction on a sentencing court is that the conditions of probation it imposes be reasonable. See State v. Pless, 282 Ga. 58, 60, 646 S.E.2d 202 (2007) (probation and suspension statutes vest broad discretion in trial judges to impose any reasonable condition of probation); Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga.App. 162, 163, 438 S.E.2d 661 (1993). Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in holding that the imposition of electronic monitoring on misdemeanor defendants is prohibited. The fact that electronic monitoring and other conditions of probation are described in Article 2 as acceptable sentencing options for felony probationers supervised by the DOC, does not, in and of itself, prohibit the