☢ test - Í

lacked the requisite suspicion. Peters did not flee from a high drug sale area at the sight of the officers. Compare Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (defendant ‘looked in the direction of the officers and fled’); Harris v. State, 205 Ga.App. 813, 814(1), 423 S.E.2d 723 (1992) (when defendant and others ‘saw the patrol car, they began running’). Instead, Peters continued hurrying toward his car, just as he was before he spotted the officers. See State v. Winnie, 242 Ga.App. 228, 529 S.E.2d 215 (2000). Appearing nervous in the presence of police officers also falls short of the reasonable, articulable suspicion required by Terry. See Holt v. State, 227 Ga.App. 46, 50, 487 S.E.2d 629 (1997).” Almond v. State, 242 Ga.App. 650, 530 S.E.2d 750 (March 9, 2000). Cocaine possession conviction affirmed; officer didn’t improperly expand stop by beginning drug investigation. Good general quote about the scope of Terry stops: “While a reasonable investigative stop does not offend against the Fourth Amendment, a Terry stop is subject to strict boundaries regarding duration, intent, and scope. Such a stop has been described by this court as a brief stop, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion, and limited in scope to identification and limited questioning reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initiation of the momentary stop. See State v. Blair, 239 Ga.App. 340, 341, 521 S.E.2d 380 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’ Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500(II), 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); see Smith v. State, 216 Ga.App. 453, 454(2), 454 S.E.2d 635 (1995).” X. SELF-INCRIMINATION See subheading SEARCHES – BLOOD TESTS/OTHER BODILY SUBSTANCES, above Y. STANDING See subheading EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, above Z. WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 514 S.E.2d 205 (March 8, 1999). “After his arrest, the warrantless seizure of the shoes Cromartie was wearing, which were later found to be consistent with the shoe prints at the [scene of the crime], was legal. Batton v. State, 260 Ga. 127, 130(3), 391 S.E.2d 914 (1990) (warrantless seizure of shoes worn by defendant when arrested is proper as a search incident to arrest).” XVII. SENTENCING See also DUI- SENTENCING and PROBATION, above A. AGGRAVATED SENTENCE 1. GENERALLY/ APPRENDI Hurst v. Florida, 14-7505, ___ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (January 12, 2016). Reversing Florida Supreme Court; “Florida’s [capital] sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance,” violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Follows Apprendi (June 26, 2000), and Ring (June 24, 2002), below; overrules Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989) ( per curiam )) and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (both upholding constitutionality of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme). Following Hurst’s conviction for murdering his co-worker, “[a] penalty-phase jury recommended [by 7-5 vote] that Hurst’s judge impose a death sentence. Notwithstanding this recommendation, Florida law required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty. The judge so found and sentenced Hurst to death.” “Florida employs … a ‘hybrid’ proceeding ‘in which [a] jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations.’ Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608, n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). First, the sentencing judge conducts an evidentiary hearing before a jury. [Cit.] Next, the jury renders an ‘advisory sentence’ of life or death without specifying the factual basis of its recommendation [Cit.]. ‘Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.’ [Cit.]. If the court imposes death, it must ‘set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based.’ [Cit.] Although the judge must give the jury recommendation ‘great weight,’ [Cit.], the sentencing order must ‘reflect the trial judge’s independent judgment about the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors,’ [Cit.].” “The analysis the Ring Court applied to Arizona’s sentencing scheme applies equally to Florida’s. Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a judge to find these facts. [Cit.] Although Florida incorporates an advisory jury verdict that Arizona lacked, we have previously made clear that this distinction is immaterial: ‘It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge.