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single, previously filed demand in its entirety,” overruling Ringo vs. State , 219 Ga.App. 753, 466 S.E.2d 660 (1996), to the extent it conflicts. Fisher v. State, 244 Ga.App. 113, 534 S.E.2d 845 (May 19, 2000). DUI and related convictions affirmed. Speedy trial demand is waived by counsel’s notice of conflict. State v. Davis , 243 Ga.App. 867, 534 S.E.2d 159 (April 26, 2000). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for discharge based on statutory speedy trial demand where failure to try case within two terms was based on defendant’s request for continuance to accommodate counsel’s leave request. “[T]he accused can waive his right to automatic discharge ‘by some action on his part or on the part of his counsel, such as his own request for a continuance of the case. [Cit.]’ Parker v. State, 135 Ga.App. 620, 621(4), 218 S.E.2d 324 (1975). ‘A waiver of the demand would result from a continuance granted on the motion of the accused, or from any other act on his part showing affirmatively that he consented to passing the case until a subsequent term [outside the period allowed by his demand].’ Walker v. State, 89 Ga. 482, 15 S.E. 553 (1892). Accord Adams v. State, 129 Ga.App. 839, 842, 201 S.E.2d 649 (1973). In this case, counsel's request for a continuance and consent to reset the trial to a time outside the period allowed by the demand for speedy trial waived defendant's right to automatic discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-170(b). The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion.” Doehling v. State, 238 Ga.App. 293, 518 S.E.2d 137 (May 11, 1999). Defendant’s speedy trial demand, waived in writing before first appeal, was not automatically revived on remand. Distinguishing Henry v. James , 264 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994) (no need to re-file speedy trial demand on remand): “the underlying requirement remains that a valid demand for trial must exist.” Sykes v. State, 236 Ga.App. 518, 511 S.E.2d 566 (February 3, 1999). Trial court did not err in finding that defendant had waived speedy trial demand in his DUI prosecution. Charged with DUI on December 2, 1997, defendant filed his speedy trial demand in Cobb State Court on December 18, 1997. Defense counsel then received a notice that trial was scheduled for January 2, 1998, but defendant did not receive the notice because it was sent to an incomplete address. Trial was reset to April 17, 1998 – outside the term following filing of the demand. Motions were set for hearing on February 25, but defendant and counsel failed to appear. The court directed that trial would be conducted the next day and ordered that defendant and counsel be summoned for trial at 9:00 a.m., but they failed to appear for that as well. Associate counsel appeared later that day, objected to inadequate notice of trial, stated that defendant was out of state, and that lead counsel was also unavailable. “[T]he trial court … ruled that Sykes’ failure to appear in court waived his speedy trial demand.” “ Although Sykes went to great effort to assure that he did not formally request a continuance, requesting a continuance is not the only way to waive a demand for trial. ‘Any affirmative action of the defendant which results in a continuance of the case, or a failure to try it within the time fixed by the statute after the filing of a demand, has the effect of tolling the time. [Cits.]’ Letbedder v. State, 129 Ga.App. 196, 197(1), n. 1, 199 S.E.2d 270 (1973). A waiver of a demand for a jury trial may result from any act by the defendant that shows affirmatively that he consented to passing the case until a later term. State v. Waters, 170 Ga.App. 505, 508(3), 317 S.E.2d 614 (1984). The defendant’s actions must show that he ‘affirmatively sought to avoid trial.’ Birts [ v. State, 192 Ga.App. 476, 477, 385 S.E.2d 120 (1989).]” Trial court could so find here: notice of the January 2 trial date was sufficient because sent to the last address of record, and court could assume defendant received the notice since counsel did. Defendant did not object when trial was next set outside the term, although counsel acknowledged he was aware of it. Trial court could find that defendant and counsel “absent[ed] themselves so as to avoid the call of the case for trial” at the February motion hearing. “We also find unpersuasive Sykes’ argument that he was not obliged to appear for trial because he did not receive notice of the trial date in accordance with USCR 32.1. Compliance with Rule 32.1 must be judged in the circumstances of each case. Payne v. State, 195 Ga.App. 523, 524(1), 394 S.E.2d 781 (1990). If we were to adopt Sykes’ reading of the rule, the harshest sanction available would be required any time a defendant could not be given the full notice the rule prescribes. In the circumstances of this case, the trial court was complying with Sykes’ demand for trial, and the only way that could be done was by deviating from the requirement of USCR 32.1. Given the history of this case, which includes the instance in which Sykes did not appear for trial even when his attorney was given proper, timely written notice of the trial set for January 2, 1998, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion. Croft v. State, 180 Ga.App. 705, 706, 350 S.E.2d 34 (1986).” XIX. VENUE See also CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – VENUE, above A. CHANGE OF See also PROCEDURE – MOVING TRIAL OUT OF COURTHOUSE, above