☢ test - Í

U.S. 443, 451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965), and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 226-227 (C.A.1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last.” “The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what the reason of the matter suggests: In allowing the court to grant ‘good-cause continuances’ when either ‘prisoner or his counsel ’ is present, it contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added).” OO. WITHDRAWAL Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286 (February 1, 2010). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly declined to charge jury on defense of withdrawal. “Appellant's requested charge tracked the language of OCGA § 16-4-9, which provides that withdrawal is a defense if the defendant can show that he withdrew ‘ before [any] overt act [to effect the object of the conspiracy] occurred.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-4-9. … As appellant himself admitted, prior to his alleged withdrawal from the conspiracy, he acted to lead his co-indictees to the home where the victims were present; told his co-indictees, who were seeking victims to rob, about the dice game money he observed on the floor of the home; accompanied an armed co-indictee to the home and knocked on the door; and gave his name so as to enable his armed co-indictee to gain entry when the door was opened in response to appellant's words. The conspiracy to rob the victims could not have been effected without appellant's performance of these overt acts. See generally Bradford v. State, 285 Ga. 1(2) (673 S.E.2d 201) (2009) (‘overt act’ in OCGA § 16-4-8 refers to an open or manifest act made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a crime).” Sanders v. State, 293 Ga.App. 534, 667 S.E.2d 396 (September 15, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for giving false name, even though he ultimately gave his true name. “Sanders argues that, because he eventually gave his name to police, he ‘withdrew’ from the crime of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer and thus could not be found guilty of that crime. However, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict of guilty on the charge of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer.” VII. DUI A. ALCO-SENSOR Travis v. State, 314 Ga.App. 280, 724 S.E.2d 15 (February 22, 2012). DUI conviction affirmed; mistrial not required where jury accidentally heard numerical result of Alco-Sensor on video recording of stop. Trial court instructed jurors “that with the [A]lco[-S]ensor device, which is a portable breath testing device, the results are not used as evidence of the amount of alcohol. The [A]lco[-S]ensor is used as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.” Rowell v. State, 312 Ga.App. 559, 718 S.E.2d 890 (November 15, 2011). DUI and weaving convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting numerical reading of alco-sensor during motion to suppress hearing. “It is well- established that ‘alco-sensor results are not used as evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in a person's blood. Instead, the alco-sensor is used as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2) (436 S.E.2d 475) (1993). Thus, this Court has held that such information is not admissible even for considering probable cause. State v. Holler, 224 Ga.App. 66 (479 S.E.2d 780) (1996). But see State v. Rish, 295 Ga.App. 815, 817 (673 S.E.2d 259) (2009) (citing numerical alco-sensor reading in reversing the grant of defendant's motion to suppress).” No evidence, however, that trial court relied on alco-sensor reading in ruling on motion. Tunali v. State , 311 Ga.App. 844, 717 S.E.2d 341 (October 4, 2011). In prosecution for driving a commercial vehicle with a detectable presence of alcohol and related offense, trial court properly denied motion to suppress; officer was not required to read implied consent warning prior to administering roadside alco-sensor test “designed to test for the presence of alcohol. That result, the presence vel non of alcohol, was the only evidence tendered at the hearing, and no blood alcohol concentration was at issue. OCGA § 40–5–153(c) applies to commercial drivers and requires that an implied consent warning be given to drivers of commercial vehicles when an officer administers a test to determine the person's ‘alcohol concentration or the presence of other drugs. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, as this Court has held when analyzing the admissibility of testing of noncommercial drivers under OCGA § 40–6–392, which is explicitly referenced in OCGA § 40–5–153(a), the implied consent warning requirement does not apply to alco-sensor tests, which merely detect the presence, not concentration, of alcohol. See Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571(2), 436 S.E.2d 475 (1993) (no requirement to give implied consent warning for alco-sensor test); Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga.App. 145, 146(1), 335 S.E.2d 630 (1985) (same). This is consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase ‘alcohol concentration or the presence