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Chadwick v. State, 236 Ga.App. 199, 511 S.E.2d 286 (February 2, 1999). Charges of possession of marijuana by ingestion, and driving while under the influence of marijuana, should have merged for sentencing purposes. “The State having used up all the evidence in proving one crime, it was error for the court to sentence Chadwick for both charges.” T. SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS See EVIDENCE – SIMILAR TRANSACATIONS– DUI, below U. UNDER 21 Dodds v. State, 288 Ga.App. 231, 653 S.E.2d 828 (November 5, 2007). Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for under-21 per se DUI, even if he didn’t have probable cause to arrest for less-safe DUI. After stopping defendant for a tag violation, “the officer noticed the smell of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. After noticing that Dodds’s driver’s license indicated that Dodds was under 21 years old, the officer asked Dodds if he had been drinking. Dodds replied that he had consumed ‘about two beers ... a little bit earlier.’ The officer then asked Dodds to step outside of his vehicle, and as they spoke further, the officer noticed the smell of alcohol coming from Dodds’s person. … The officer did not have Dodds perform any field sobriety tests.” “The officer did not need to show a reason to believe that Dodds was a less safe driver, or that he was impaired; he needed only to show reason to believe that Dodds, a 19 year old, had a blood alcohol concentration of .02 within three hours of driving (from the alcohol he consumed prior to driving). [fn] In light of Dodds’s admission that he had two beers ‘a little bit earlier,’ and the smell of alcohol the officer perceived from Dodds’s person, the trial court correctly concluded that the officer had probable cause to believe Dodds had violated OCGA § 40-6-391(k)(1).” Distinguishing Ricks v. State , 255 Ga.App. 188, 564 S.E.2d 793 (April 30, 2002) (under-21 defendant arrested for less safe DUI, not per se DUI, on similar facts; evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest.). Firsanov v. State, 270 Ga. 873, 512 S.E.2d 184 (February 22, 1999). 1. Former OCGA § 40-6-391(k) did not violate “equal protection by distinguishing between those persons under 18 and persons 18-21, all of whom are legally unable to drink (OCGA § 3-3-23(a)(2)) and are thus similarly situated, in an arbitrary manner not rationally related to any legitimate State interest. [fn: OCGA § 40-6-391 was amended effective July 1, 1997 eliminating this distinction by raising the age in subsection (k) to 21. Ga.L. 1997, p. 760, § 23. ] Because no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999), the challenged statute need only bear a rational relationship to some legitimate State purpose. Id. ‘Protection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children represent two legitimate state purposes. [Cits.]’ Id. We agree with the trial court that former OCGA § 40-6-391(k) was rationally related to the State’s interest in both of these purposes, Barnett, supra, and that the legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between those drivers under age 18 and drivers between 18 and 21 years of age due the greater inexperience and immaturity possessed by drivers under the age of 18. See Kelley v. State, 252 Ga. 208(2), 312 S.E.2d 328 (1984).” 2. Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence, under age 21. “The evidence established that the officer knew Firsanov’s age, observed his bloodshot eyes and flushed face, smelled a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath, and discovered beers on ice in a cooler in Firsanov’s trunk. Although this evidence alone may not have been sufficient to convict Firsanov of DUI, ‘“[t]he same strictness of proof required for a finding of guilt is not necessary for probable cause. (Cit.)” ... [Cit.]’ Campbell v. State, 221 Ga.App. 105, 107(2), 470 S.E.2d 503 (1996). Compare Clay v. State, 193 Ga.App. 377(2), 387 S.E.2d 644 (1989) and Davis v. State, 206 Ga.App. 647(1), 426 S.E.2d 267 (1992) (evidence insufficient to support convictions).” Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (January 11, 1999). OCGA § 40-6-391(k) does not violate equal protection by creating a separate standard for per se DUI for under-21 drivers. Statute does not disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, so “it need only bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose,” Phagan v. State , 268 Ga. 272, 275, 486 S.E.2d 876 (1997). This statute bears reasonable relationship to two legitimate public purposes: “[p]rotection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children represent two legitimate state purposes.” “OCGA § 40-6-391(k) bears a reasonable relationship to both of these purposes, in that it protects public safety by prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles by young people who lack experience both in driving and in judging the effect of alcohol on their ability to drive, thus posing a greater threat to the public safety than older, more experienced drivers. Further, it protects, children by providing a strong disincentive to violate alcohol consumption laws, see OCGA § 3-3-23, and makes it easier for young drivers who are inexperienced with alcohol to understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume virtually any amount of alcohol, thereby promoting the well-being of children by protecting them from the dangers of driving while intoxicated.” VIII. EVIDENCE See also main heading WITNESSES, below A. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES